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In recent decades, the US wage structure has been transformed by a rising college premium, a narrowing
gender gap, and increasing persistent and transitory residual wage dispersion. This paper explores
the implications of these changes for cross-sectional inequality in hours worked, earnings and consumption,
and for welfare. The framework for the analysis is an incomplete-markets overlapping-generations
model in which individuals choose education and form households, and households choose consumption
and intra-family time allocation. An explicit production technology underlies equilibrium prices for
labor inputs differentiated by gender and education. The model is parameterized using micro data from
the PSID, the CPS and the CEX. With the changing wage structure as the only primitive force, the
model can account for the key trends in cross-sectional US data. We also assess the role played by
education, labor supply, and saving in providing insurance against shocks, and in exploiting opportunities
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The structure of relative wages in the US economy has undergone a major transformation in
the last three decades. Wage diﬀerentials between college-graduates and high-school graduates
dropped in the 1970s, but have risen sharply since then (Katz and Autor, 1999). The wage
gap between men and women has shrunk signiﬁcantly (Goldin, 2006). Within narrow groups
of workers deﬁned by education, gender and age, the distribution of wages has become much
more unequal. This increase in residual wage dispersion reﬂects increasing volatility in both
persistent and transitory shocks (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Gottschalk and Moﬃtt,
1994).
Over the same period, the US economy experienced large changes in the distributions of
labor supply, earnings, and consumption. Women’s hours worked, relative to men’s, almost
doubled between 1970 and 2000. Conditional on working, cross-sectional variation in hours
remained stable for men, but narrowed markedly for women. The correlation between wages and
hours increased sharply, especially for men. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, dispersion in
measures of household consumption increased much less than dispersion in household earnings
(Krueger and Perri, 2006; Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura, 2007).1
A vast literature addresses the sources of changes in the wage distribution (for surveys, see
Acemoglu, 2002; Hornstein et al., 2006). However, much less research has been devoted to
exploring whether this transformation has important macroeconomic and welfare implications.
In this paper, the primitive forces behind changes in the wage structure are conceptualized as a
combination of exogenous shifts in the relative demand for distinct types of labor diﬀerentiated
by gender and education, coupled with exogenous variations in persistent and transitory id-
iosyncratic productivity risk. We ﬁrst ask whether the observed change in the wage structure,
deﬁned this way, is quantitatively consonant with observed changes in the distributions of labor
supply, earnings and consumption. We then address the welfare implications of changes in the
wage structure, and investigate how endogenous changes in behavior allow households to both
insure against additional risk, and to take advantage of new opportunities presented by shifts
in relative demand.
Answering these questions requires an economic model delivering predictions for hours, earn-
ings, consumption and welfare, given wages as inputs. The standard macroeconomic framework
for studying distributional issues is the class of heterogeneous-agents incomplete-markets mod-
els developed by Bewley (1986), ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1989), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), and
R´ ıos-Rull (1995). Workers in these models are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic labor mar-
1All these facts will be documented in Section 2 based on data from the Consumers Expenditures Survey
(CEX), the Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
1ket shocks, but can borrow and lend through a risk-free bond to smooth consumption.
The prototypical incomplete markets model adopts the ﬁction of the “bachelor household”.
However, the decline in the gender wage gap and the rise in female participation have potentially
large eﬀects on inequality and welfare that can only be understood by explicitly modeling
two-person households. Furthermore, wages and hours worked are characteristics recorded
at the individual level, while consumption and welfare are typically measured at the level
of the household. This presents an obvious challenge for the bachelor model as a lens for
interpreting micro data. We therefore model households as comprising two potential earners,
facing imperfectly correlated shocks. This model provides a mapping from individual wages
to the within-household allocation of market hours, which in turn determines household-level
income, consumption and, ultimately, welfare.
The life-cycle of individuals in the model is as follows. First they choose education, given
an idiosyncratic cost of attending college. Then they form households comprising husbands
and wives. Couples move through the rest of the life-cycle together. During working age, the
family chooses consumption, asset holdings and labor supply of both spouses. Retirement is
ﬁnanced through savings and a simple public pension system.
Another important feature of the model is an explicit production technology that aggregates
capital and four types of labor input, deﬁned by gender and educational attainment (as in Katz
and Murphy, 1992; Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1998). The prices of diﬀerent types of labor
input are equilibrium market-clearing outcomes, where both demand and supply change over
time. Changes in labor demand for college relative to high-school graduates and for women
relative to men are modeled as exogenously time-varying weights in the aggregate production
technology, which we label “skill-biased” and “gender-biased” demand shifts. Changes in the
supply of diﬀerent labor inputs reﬂect the cumulative eﬀects of individuals’ optimal education
choices and households’ choices of hours worked for both spouses.
The four distinct exogenous forces driving wage dynamics – skill and gender-biased demand
shifts, and changes in the volatility of persistent and transitory individual-speciﬁc productivity
shocks - are parameterized to reproduce, respectively, the observed rise in the skill premium,
the observed decline in the gender wage gap, and the increases in the persistent and transitory
components of residual wage dispersion estimated from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for 1967-2003.
The advantage of being explicit about the underlying technology is that we can conduct two
sets of counter-factual experiments. First, we activate the exogenous forces driving the wage
structure one at a time, to shed light on the role of each time-varying component in explaining
the evolution of cross-sectional inequality. Second, by varying the set of choice variables for
2individuals (savings, labor supply, female participation, enrollment), we can isolate the roles of
diﬀerent behavioral responses in mediating the welfare eﬀects of these changes.
Overall, the quantitative experiment is successful in that the calibrated model, coupled with
the estimated changes in the wage structure, can account for many important trends in our
cross-sectional data.
First, the model accounts for three quarters of the observed rise in relative hours worked
for women. The key driving force is the narrowing gender wage gap (as in Jones, Manuelli
and McGrattan, 2003). The model misses the rise in female hours in the period 1965-1975,
suggesting non-wage factors were at work at that time.
Second, because of the modest individual labor-supply elasticity, the model predicts little
change in the dispersion of hours worked for men, as in the data. However, it also predicts stable
dispersion in female hours worked, contrary to the decline observed in the data. Conﬂicting
forces are at work: more volatile idiosyncratic shocks tend to increase inequality, while the
smaller gender wage gap reduces inequality in female hours towards the level for men.
Third, the model successfully replicates observed dynamics in the correlation between in-
dividual wages and individual hours, for both men and women. Transitory shocks, which are
largely self-insurable through savings, induce individuals to work more when wages are tem-
porarily high. Thus, the rise in the variance of transitory shocks pushes up the wage-hour
correlation. Rising relative demand for female labor is also important: as women’s share of
household earnings rises over time, shocks to male wages come to have a smaller impact on
household consumption, implying smaller oﬀsetting wealth eﬀects on hours worked.
Fourth, the model generates increases in household earnings and consumption dispersion
in line with the US evidence. Skill-biased (and gender-biased) demand shifts aﬀect inequality
in earnings and consumption symmetrically, since households do not adjust savings much in
response to such permanent changes in the wage structure. In contrast, changes in the variance
of wage risk have very diﬀerent eﬀects on earnings and consumption inequality, reﬂecting self
insurance through labor supply, borrowing and saving. In the model, more volatile transitory
shocks have very little eﬀect on consumption dispersion, while bigger persistent shocks increase
consumption inequality only about half as much as earnings inequality.
Finally, the model can explain one third of the slowdown in aggregate labor productivity that
began in the early 1970s, and two thirds of the acceleration since 1995. These changes entirely
reﬂect behavioral responses to changes in the wage structure. In the earlier period, women’s
relative hours are rising, thanks to gender-biased demand shifts. These women earn less per
hour than the average working man, which translates into declining average productivity. In
the 1995-2005 decade, productivity growth reﬂects a large inﬂow to the labor force of college
3graduates, whose relative wages are rising thanks to skill-biased demand shifts.
Given the model’s success in replicating key trends in cross-sectional dispersion, we feel con-
ﬁdent in using it to assess the welfare costs of observed changes in the wage structure.2 We ﬁnd
that (ex-ante) welfare costs vary dramatically across cohorts, such that early cohorts entering
the labor market in the 1970s and early 1980s lose up to 0.5 percent of permanent consumption
relative to the 1965 cohort, while later cohorts are in fact left better oﬀ, in expected terms, as
a result of structural change in labor markets. However, there is great dispersion in expected
welfare eﬀects conditional on education. For example, households comprising two high-school
graduates who enter the labor market in 1990 expect a loss equal to 3.7% of permanent con-
sumption relative to the 1965 cohort.
The set of counter-factuals in which we shut down various margins of adjustment to struc-
tural change shed further light on the sources of welfare gains and losses. Welfare losses are
primarily due to bigger persistent shocks, while gender-biased and especially skill-biased de-
mand shifts are welfare improving. We ﬁnd that savings and labor supply are the most impor-
tant adjustment margins used by households to mitigate the adverse eﬀects of larger persistent
volatility. We also conclude that, over the past thirty years, US households have been able to
take great advantage of the opportunities presented by gender-biased and skill-biased demand
shifts by increasing female participation and college enrollment, respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stylized facts of interest.
Section 3 presents the model, and deﬁnes the equilibrium. Section 4 describes the calibration
and estimation strategy. Section 5 contains the main results on the macroeconomic and welfare
consequences of the changing wage structure. Section 6 concludes. In the Appendix, we describe
the CEX, CPS and PSID samples, and the estimation of the statistical wage process.
2 Stylized facts
This section describes the salient facts motivating our exercise. Statistics on wages, hours
and earnings reported in this section are all computed from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) March Files (1967-2005). Statistics on household consumption are based on Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) data (1980-2003). Enrollment data are taken from the US Census
Bureau. Our sample comprises married households where the husband is 25-59 years old.
Appendix A contains a detailed description of the underlying micro data, the handling of
2There is a small but growing literature on the implications of rising inequality for the distribution of
household consumption and welfare. The question was ﬁrst addressed by Attanasio and Davis (1996) and,
subsequently by Blundell and Preston (1998), Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), Krueger and Perri (2003,
2006), Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007). At various points in the
paper, we compare and contrast our methodology and results to the existing literature.
4measurement issues, and sample selection criteria.3
College premium and enrollment. Panel (A) of Figure 1 plots the evolution of college
wage premium for men and women in the United States over the period 1967-2005. The male
(female) college wage premium is deﬁned as the ratio between the average hourly wage of men
(women) with at least a college degree and the average hourly wage of men (women) without
college degree. In the late 1960s, male college graduates earned around 45% more than men
without a college degree. Over the 1970s, the college-high school wage diﬀerential declined to
30%. Since the late 1970s, the male college premium has been rising, reaching 90% in 2000.
The dynamics of the college wage premium for married women are qualitatively similar, with
a more prolonged fall over the 1970s and a smaller rise since 1980. While the college premium
was almost identical across sexes in the late 1960s, it is now substantially lower for women
(65% versus 90%). These magnitudes are consistent with those documented in the literature
(see Katz and Autor, 1999, Table 3; or Eckstein and Nagypal, 2004, Figures 6 and 7).
Panel (C) shows that college enrollment rose remarkably for both men and women over the
same period. The fraction of women aged 25-29 with a college degree almost tripled, and in
the mid 1990s women’s enrollment rates overtook men’s.4
The simultaneity of the increase in the relative supply and relative price of college-educated
labor indicates a growth in aggregate labor demand favoring college graduates, which, following
the literature, we label a “skill-biased demand shift”. Technological change and, to a lesser
extent, increased openness to trade have been identiﬁed as the main exogenous drivers of this
shift (see, among others, Katz and Murphy, 1992; Krusell et al., 2000; Acemoglu, 2002).5
Gender gap in wages and hours worked. Panel (B) depicts the dynamics of the gender
wage gap, deﬁned as the ratio of male to female wages. The gender gap stayed constant around
1.65 until the late 1970s and then declined rapidly to 1.35 by 2003. The rise in relative female
wages coincided with a surge in relative female hours: panel (D) shows than in the late 1960s
women worked 30% as much as men, while since the 1990s women’s market hours have been
almost 60% of men’s.6 The trends in panels (B) and (D) are in line with existing estimates.
3In our sample 75% of households where the head is 40-45 years old are couples, with single and divorced
households accounting equally for the rest. Thus, our sample contains most of the US population.
4Men’s college enrollment shows a slower upward trend, and a large deviation above trend around the mid
1970s which is hard to explain through price movements. Some authors attribute this temporary surge in college
enrollment to the incentives provided by the Vietnam War draft deferment rules for male college students and
the GI Bill beneﬁts for war veterans who took on college training programs (Card and Lemieux, 2001).
5In the existing literature the leading explanation for this shift is the rapid adoption of new information and
communication technologies (ICT) which raised the relative productivity of more educated labor (“skill-biased
technical change”). A less prominent role is attributed to falling demand for unskilled-intensive goods produced
in the US due to greater openness to trade with developing countries abundant in unskilled labor.
6As common in the literature (e.g., Blau and Kahn, 2000), we report the full-time gender gap, where full-time
5Goldin (2006, Figure 6) and Blau and Kahn (2000, Figure 1) report virtually the same path as
panel (B) for the gender wage gap, and Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003, Figure 1) show
a similar rise in relative hours worked for married women.
We interpret these trends using a supply-demand logic similar to that applied to the college
premium: since relative female wages and hours rose at the same time, a “gender-biased demand
shift” in favor of female labor was operative over this period. An increase in the demand for
women could be driven either by changes in technology favoring occupations in which women
have a comparative advantage, or by changes in social norms making qualiﬁed women more
willing to seek high-paying positions, and employers more willing to hire them.7
Wage inequality. Panel (A) of Figure 2 plots the variance of log hourly wages for men and
women over the 1967-2005 period.8 Interestingly, the increase is quite similar across genders,
around 20 log points (or 0.20) over the entire period. This rise in cross-sectional wage inequality
has been well documented in the literature. For example, Katz and Autor (1999, Table 4B)
document a similar increase for men and women, around 15 log points from 1970 to 1995.
The rising college premium (i.e. between-educational-group inequality) accounts for a siz-
able part (around 1/3) of the increase, but rising residual (within-group) inequality explains
the lion’s share. This fact has been well known since the seminal work of Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993). Changes in the college premium are, by deﬁnition, permanent shocks once the
education decision has been made. However, as ﬁrst pointed out by Gottschalk and Moﬃtt
(1994), rising residual inequality can be either persistent or transitory in nature. In Section 4.1,
the panel dimension of PSID is used to estimate a statistical model for cross-sectional residual
male wage dispersion in order to distinguish the persistent from the transitory components.
This decomposition of residual inequality is a key input of our exercise.
Labor-supply inequality. While there is a growing literature on the dynamics of wage
inequality, this paper is one of the ﬁrst to explore the dynamics of dispersion in hours worked,
and in the correlation between wages and hours. Panel (B) of Figure 2 plots the variance of log
hours worked by gender.9 Here, in contrast to the skill premia and wage inequality, both the
work is deﬁned to be 2000 hours per year or more. This criterion is used because women are more likely to be
employed part-time, and part-time work carries a wage penalty (see e.g. Manning and Petrongolo, 2007).
7Goldin (2006) discusses the sources of the labor demand shift that has occurred since the 1960s – what she
calls the “quiet revolution”. She points to the impact of WWII in showing employers that women could be
proﬁtable and reliable workers; the role of contraceptives in allowing women to plan their careers and to become
viable candidates for high-paying jobs like lawyers or managers; the structural shift towards the service sector
with its more ﬂexible work schedule; and, ﬁnally, the role of anti-discrimination legislation.
8The cross-sectional moments plotted in Figure 2 (as well as Figures 4, and 6-12) are demeaned in order to
visualize diﬀerences in trends. Means are reported in square brackets in the legend.
9By construction, this statistic excludes women who do not participate. We deﬁne an individual as a
nonparticipant if he/she works less than 260 hours in the market, i.e. a quarter of part-time work. None of the
6levels and the trends are rather diﬀerent for men versus women. Hours inequality is much higher
for women, and female hours inequality declines throughout the period, while it is basically ﬂat
for men.
Panel (C) reports the cross-sectional correlation between log wages and log hours by gender.
This correlation rises until the late 1980s. The rise for men is more pronounced, around 0.25
versus 0.15 for women. In the 1990s and beyond, the correlation is stable for men, while it
declines somewhat for women.
The variance of individual log earnings (not plotted) can be computed residually given the
moments discussed above as the sum of (i) the variance of log wages, (ii) the variance of log
hours, and (iii) twice the covariance between log wages and log hours.
Household earnings and consumption inequality. The variances of household log
earnings and equivalized log consumption are plotted in panel (D) of Figure 2.10 Household
earnings inequality rose steadily by 23 log points over the period, driven by increases in wage
inequality and in the wage-hour correlation.11
The second line in this plot is the variance of log household equivalized consumption. The
CEX data, assembled by Krueger and Perri (2006), are consistently available only since 1980.
We use the same deﬁnition of consumption as Krueger and Perri: expenditures on nondurable
goods, services and small durables, such as household appliances, plus services from housing
and vehicles (this variable is labelled ND+). As previously documented by Cutler and Katz
(1991) and Johnson and Shipp (1997), consumption inequality tracks earnings inequality quite
closely in the 1980s. Slesnick (2001) and Krueger and Perri (2006) uncovered the surprising
divergence between the two series in the 1990s and beyond.
Overall, between 1980 and 2003, household log earnings dispersion rises more than twice as
much as log consumption dispersion: 17 versus 7 log points. Comparable results on trends in US
consumption inequality for the 1990s are reported by Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2007),
and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), notwithstanding diﬀerences in the methodologies
used to organize the data.
Model inputs and targets. The facts just described form the basis of the quantitative
key trends in hours is sensitive to this threshold: however, the lower the threshold, the higher is the level of
measured inequality.
10We follow Krueger and Perri (2006) in using the Census scale to construct adult equivalent measures of
household consumption. Equivalizing earnings is of less importance: the increase in the variance of household
log equivalized earnings is 0.20, i.e. just 3 log points lower than our benchmark series.
11Evidence on the within-household correlation between male and female wages is mixed. The CPS data
show an increase concentrated in the 1980s, while PSID data display some swings, but no clear trend over the
sample period. See Technical Appendix T-2 for a short discussion, and Figure T-4 for a plot of this moment
in both data sets. We return to this point in Section 4.1 when discussing the assumptions on the female wage
process.
7analysis of our paper. Some facts serve as inputs to the model, and others as targets for the
model. The college-high school wage diﬀerential and the college enrollment rate allow us to
infer a time-path for skill-biased demand shifts, our ﬁrst input. Similarly, the male-female wage
and hours diﬀerentials enable us to derive a time path for gender-biased demand shifts, the
second input. As we have already explained, time paths for the variances of persistent and
transitory idiosyncratic wage shocks, our third and fourth inputs, are estimated using PSID
data.
The aim of the thought experiment is to assess the extent to which these changes in the
wage structure, taken as exogenous, can account for observed changes in the distribution of male
and female hours worked (gender diﬀerentials in average hours, variances of hours, and wage-
hour correlations), in household earnings inequality, and, ﬁnally, in household consumption
inequality. These moments are our targets.
3 Economic model
We begin by describing the model’s demographic structure, preferences, production technolo-
gies, government policies, and ﬁnancial markets. Next, we outline the life cycle of the agents
and deﬁne a competitive equilibrium.
3.1 Preliminaries
Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0,1,..., and continues forever.
Demographics The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals, equally many
females and males. Gender is indexed by g ∈ {m,f} and age is denoted by j ∈ J ≡ {1,2,...,J}.
Prior to age J, individuals survive from age j to j + 1 with age-dependent probability ζ
j. At
each date a new cohort of measure one of each gender enters the economy. Since the cohort
size and survival probabilities are time-invariant, the model age distribution is stationary.
Life-cycle The life cycle of individuals is comprised of four stages: education, matching,
work, and retirement. In the ﬁrst two stages, the decision unit is the individual. In the second
two stages the decision unit is the household, i.e. a pair of spouses. Since our focus is mostly
on labor market risk, we simplify the ﬁrst two stages of the life cycle by letting education and
matching take place sequentially in a pre-labor market period of life labeled “age zero”. Thus
agents enter the labor market as married adults at age j = 1, retire at age j = jR, and die with
certainty if they reach age j = J.
Preferences We let u(ct,xt) be the period utility function deﬁned over market consump-
tion ct and a non-market (or home) good xt. Both ct and xt are public goods for the household.
8This assumption implies that we do not need to distinguish between utility at the level of the
individual spouse and utility at the level of the household, or between unitary and collective
models of household behavior. Furthermore, viewing the family as a unitary decision maker
enjoying utility from public goods represents the smallest possible deviation from the standard
single-agent “bachelor” model that predominates in the life-cycle consumption-savings liter-
ature. The non-market good xt is jointly produced with male and female non-market hours
according to the constant returns to scale technology x
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denotes hours worked in the market by the spouse of gender g.12
Technology There is one ﬁnal market good produced by a representative ﬁrm using ag-




t where α is capital’s share of output, and Zt is a time-varying scaling factor.
Output can be used for household consumption Ct, government consumption Gt, investment
It, or net exports NXt. Capital depreciates at rate δ.
We follow Katz and Murphy (1992) and Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) in modeling
aggregate labor Ht as a CES aggregator of four types of labor input, H
g,e
t , indexed by gender






































According to this speciﬁcation, male and female eﬃciency units of labor, conditional on sharing
the same education level, are perfect substitutes, while the elasticity of substitution between
the two diﬀerent education groups is θ.




t capture exogenous skill-biased and gender-biased
demand shifts in favor of college-educated labor and female labor, respectively.13
Government The government taxes labor and asset income at ﬂat rates (τn,τa) and
pays out a ﬁxed pension beneﬁt b to retirees. The government budget is balanced every period:
once the pension system has been ﬁnanced, any excess tax revenues are spent on non-valued
government consumption Gt.
Commodities, assets and markets At each date t, there are ﬁve traded commodities:
a ﬁnal good and four types of labor services, as described above. As in ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1989),
12Following Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), we do not distinguish explicitly between time devoted to
leisure and to home production. In many instances, the distinction between the two is fuzzy (e.g., in the case
of childcare, cooking, gardening, shopping). Greenwood and Hercowitz’s view is that “time [...] has no intrinsic
worth on its own [...], but instead derives its value from what can be done with it.” (page 1192).




t creates a time-varying wedge between the wages of men and women with the same
human capital. Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) model this wedge as a “tax” on the female wage in the
household budget constraint. They calibrate this sequence by matching the observed gender premium, exactly
as we do. From the viewpoint of an agent in the model, these alternative strategies are equivalent.
9Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), and R´ ıos-Rull (1995), ﬁnancial markets are incomplete: agents
trade risk-free bonds, subject to a borrowing constraint, but do not have access to state-
contingent insurance against individual labor-income risk. The interest rate on the bonds is set
internationally and is assumed to be constant and equal to r. Agents have access to annuities –
insurance against the risk of surviving. An intermediary pools savings at the end of each period,
and returns pooled savings proportionately to individuals who are still alive at the start of the
next period, at actuarially-fair rates.14 All markets are perfectly competitive.
3.2 Life cycle
We now describe the four stages of the life-cycle in detail.
3.2.1 Education
At the start of life (age zero), individuals make a discrete education choice between pursuing a
college degree (e = h) or a lower schooling degree (e = l). The utility cost of attending college
κ is idiosyncratic, and is drawn from the gender-speciﬁc distribution F g. This cost captures,
in reduced form, cross-sectional variability in scholastic talent, parental background, access to
credit, and tuition fees.
When individuals decide whether or not to go to college they consider their draw for the
cost, κ, the college wage premium they expect to command in the labor market, and the value
of being highly educated when entering the matching stage: with positive assortative matching,
acquiring a college education increases the probability of meeting a college-educated, and thus
high-earning, spouse. Let M
g
t (e) be the expected value, upon entering the matching stage at
date t, for an individual of gender g who has chosen education level e. The optimal education













t (·) denotes the gender-speciﬁc education decision rule.15 Let q
g
t be the fraction of
14While the assumption of perfect annuity markets is widely used in the literature for its convenience (it allows
one to abstract from bequests), we acknowledge that it is not realistic. However, since bequests are typically
received at a stage of the life-cycle when wealth is already sizeable, they are not an important insurance channel
against income shocks, which is the main theme of our paper.
15Our simple model for education acquisition is consistent with the key empirical patterns: (i) a positive
correlation between education and scholastic ability/parental background (i.e. low κ), (ii) a positive correlation
between education and wages, and, therefore, (iii) a positive correlation between measures of ability/background
and wages. In the model, κ does not have a direct eﬀect on earnings, it impacts earnings only through education.
The debate on whether there are returns to ability above and beyond education is ongoing. For example, in a
recent paper, Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) argue that measures of cognitive ability and schooling are so
strongly correlated that one cannot separate their eﬀects on labor market outcomes without imposing arbitrary
parametric structures in estimation (e.g., log-linearity and separability) which, when tested, are usually rejected.






t (h) − M
g
t (l)) ∈ [0,1]. (3)
3.2.2 Matching
Upon entering the matching stage, individuals are characterized by two states: gender and
education (g,e). Following Fern´ andez and Rogerson (2001), individuals of opposite gender




∈ [0,1] be the
probability that a man in education group em is assigned to a woman belonging to group ef at






The expected values upon entering the matching stage for men of high and low education
levels can be written, respectively, as:
M
m
























is expected lifetime utility at date t for each member of a newly-married (age
zero) couple comprising a male with education em and a female with education ef. Similar
expressions can be derived for the functions M
f
t (e).
The enrollment rates from the schooling stage, q
g
t, together with the matching probabilities,
π
g
t, jointly determine the education composition of newly-formed households. For example, the













where the equality is an aggregate consistency condition. Let ̺t denote the cross-sectional


















The correlation ̺t is a measure of the degree of assortative matching. We treat this correlation
as a structural parameter of the economy.
Finally, since our focus is on labor market risk, we abstract from shocks to family com-
position. Thus, matching takes place only once, and marital unions last until the couple dies
together.16
16Calibrated equilibrium models of marriage and divorce have been developed to assess the determinants of
intergenerational mobility (see e.g. Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner, 2000), and to assess the role of changes
in family composition on macroeconomic magnitudes (Cubeddu and R´ ıos-Rull, 2003). As a ﬁrst step towards
understanding the implications of household composition for changes in cross-sectional inequality, in Section
5.3 we consider a single-earner “bachelor” version of the model.
113.2.3 Work
Individuals start working at age j = 1 and retire at age jR. During this phase of the life cycle,
they allocate their time between market work and production of the non-market good xt. Labor
services supplied to the market are indexed by the gender-education pair (g,e), and each labor
input commands a type-speciﬁc competitive price p
g,e
t per eﬃciency unit.
An individual’s endowment of eﬃciency units per hour of market work (or individual labor
productivity) depends on experience and on the history of idiosyncratic labor productivity









where L(j) is a deterministic function of age and yt is the stochastic individual-speciﬁc com-
ponent of (log) labor productivity.17
Men and women face the same experience proﬁle and the same stochastic process for id-
iosyncratic productivity. We model yt as the sum of two orthogonal components: a persistent
autoregressive shock, and a transitory shock. More precisely,
yt = ηt + vt, (8)
ηt = ρηt−1 + ωt









t } capture time variation in the dispersion of idiosyncratic
transitory and persistent shocks. At age j = 1, the initial value for the persistent component is
drawn from a time-invariant distribution with mean zero and variance λ
η. Shocks are positively
but imperfectly correlated across spouses within a household. We will defend this model for
idiosyncratic productivity in Section 4.1. In what follows, for notational simplicity, we stack
the two idiosyncratic components {ηt,vt} for an individual of gender g in the vector y
g
t ∈ Y,
and denote her/his individual eﬃciency units by ε(j,y
g
t).
Households trade the risk-free asset subject to a borrowing limit a. Asset holdings are
denoted at ∈ A ≡ [a,∞). One unit of savings delivers 1/ζ
j units of assets next period,
reﬂecting the annuity-market survivors’ premium.
17Our model assumes a return to age rather than to actual labor market experience. This choice is made out
of convenience: accounting explicitly for the return to experience would add two continuous state variables (one
for each spouse), making the problem signiﬁcantly harder to solve. This simpliﬁcation is unlikely to matter for
men’s choices, since the vast majority participate throughout working life anyway. In the literature there are
diﬀerent views on the role of labor market experience for women’s work decisions. Olivetti (2006) argues that
increases in returns to experience have had a large eﬀect on women’s hours worked in the last three decades.
In contrast, Attanasio, Low and Sanchez (2008) ﬁnd small eﬀects.
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t ∈ [0,1], (9)
where the value function Vt deﬁnes expected discounted utility at time t as a function of the
state variables for the household problem: education (em,ef), age j, wealth at, and the vectors
of male and female productivity (ym
t ,y
f
t ). Preferences and the asset market structure imply
that there are neither voluntary nor accidental bequests.
The expected lifetime value for each spouse in a newly-formed household, V0





















where the zero value for the fourth argument reﬂects the assumption that agents enter the
working stage of the life cycle with zero wealth, and where the expectation is taken over the
set of possible productivity shocks at age one.18
3.2.4 Retirement
Since retirees do not work, the only state variables for a retired household (j ≥ jR) are age and
wealth. Retirees receive lump-sum social-security beneﬁts b every period until death. Beneﬁts
are taxed at rate τn. The problem of a retired household is
Vt (j,at) = max
ct,at+1
u(ct,xt) + βζ
jVt+1 (j + 1,at+1)
subject to
ct + ζ
jat+1 = [1 + (1 − τ
a)r]at + (1 − τ
n)b
xt = x(1,1)
at+1 ≥ a, ct ≥ 0, at+(J−j+1) ≥ 0 (10)
Note that the entire time endowment of each spouse is devoted to production of the non-market
good xt. The last inequality implies that agents cannot die in debt.19
18The assumption of zero initial wealth is consistent with the absence of bequests in equilibrium. We analyzed
the empirical distribution of ﬁnancial wealth for individuals aged 23-25 in the US from the 1992 Survey of
Consumer Finances. We found that median wealth is negligible for this age group ($2,000), with no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences across the two education groups. Details are available upon request.
19With a slight abuse of notation, we include only a subset of the individual states as arguments of Vt in the
retiree’s problem, since the other state variables are irrelevant during retirement.
133.3 Equilibrium
The economy is initially in a steady-state. Unexpectedly, agents discover that the economy will
experience a period of structural change, with the changes fully summarized by the sequences













. Agents have perfect foresight over the future evolution of
these sequences.
Let BA and BY be the Borel sigma algebras of A and Y, and P (E) and P (J) be the power
sets of E and J. The state space is denoted by S ≡ E
2×J × A × Y
2 with generic element s.
Let ΣS be the sigma algebra on S deﬁned as ΣS ≡ P (E)⊗P (E)⊗P (J)⊗BA ⊗BY ⊗BY and
(S,ΣS) be the corresponding measurable space. Denote the measure of households on (S,ΣS)
in period t as  t and the initial stationary distribution as  ∗.
Given  ∗ and sequences {Zt}, {̺t}, and {λt}, a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of dis-
counted values {M
g





t (s),at+1 (s)}; value functions {Vt (s)}; ﬁrm choices {H
g,e
t ,Kt}; prices {p
g,e
t };





t}; and measures of households { t} such that, for all t:
1. The education decision rule e
g
t (κ) solves the individual problem (2) and q
g
t is the fraction
of college graduates of gender g determined by (3).
2. The matching probabilities π
g
t satisfy equation (6) and the consistency conditions
qm
t πm




t (h,h) (1 − qm
t )πm



























Moreover, the discounted utilities at this stage, M
g
t (e), are deﬁned in (4).
3. The household decision rules ct (s),n
g
t (s),at+1 (s) and value functions Vt (s) solve the
household problem (9) during the work stage, and (10) during retirement.










































































and Ht is given by (1).















S ct (s)d t is aggregate consumption.
7. The world asset market clears. This requires that the change in net foreign asset position
between t and t + 1 equals the year-t current account: (At+1 − Kt+1) − (At − Kt) =
NXt + r(At − Kt), where At+1 =
R
S at+1 (s)d t is aggregate domestic wealth.
8. The government budget is balanced: Gt+(1 − τn)b
R













∈ S, and S ≡
¡
Em × Ef × J × A × Ym × Yf¢
∈ ΣS,
where {1} / ∈ J, the measures  t satisfy  t+1 (S) =
R
S Qt (s,S)d t with





































and so on for all other education pairs.
4 The computational experiment
Experiment design The ﬁrst objective of the paper is to study the implications of transfor-
mations in the wage structure for the dynamics of cross-sectional inequality in individuals’ and
households’ earnings, consumption, and labor supply. In particular, we want to assess the ability
of our model to reproduce the observed changes in a set of cross-sectional moments of interest,













the only time-varying input. The sequence {λt} is parameterized so that it reproduces the
rise in the skill premium, the narrowing of the gender gap, and the increase in transitory and
persistent residual wage inequality, respectively.
In addition, we calibrate the distributions for education costs so that the model broadly
replicates the empirical time paths for college enrollment by gender {q
g
t}. This ensures that
when applying the matching probabilities {π
g
t} from equation (11), the model will also replicate
the cross-sectional composition of households by education observed in the data.
We set the path for the aggregate scaling factor Zt so that, in the absence of any behav-
ioral response (i.e., assuming no changes in total eﬀective hours for each type of labor input),
the dynamics of λt would leave average output and labor productivity constant at the initial
steady state levels. We make this choice because we want to remain agnostic about the precise
microfoundations underlying the dynamics in the components of λt, and thus we want to avoid
15hard-wiring productivity changes in a particular direction into the design of the experiment.
Of course it is quite possible that some of the much-talked-about forces that have propelled the
observed dynamics in λt – e.g. the fall in the price of ICT capital for skill-biased demand shifts
– have also directly increased economy-wide TFP and thus welfare. Any such gains would need
to be added to the behavior-induced eﬀects that we quantify below.
We now turn to the parametrization of the model.
4.1 Parametrization
Some parameters are set outside the model, while others are estimated within the model and
require solving for equilibrium allocations. The parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
4.1.1 Parameters set externally
Demographics The model period is one year. After schooling choice and household forma-
tion, individuals enter the labor market at age 25, the median age of ﬁrst marriage for males
in the midpoint of our sample, 1982. They work for 35 years, and retire on their 60th birthday,





from the National Center for Health Statistics (1992).
Production technology The capital share parameter α is set to 0.33 and the depreciation
rate δ to 0.06 (see Cooley, 1995). The constant world pre-tax interest rate r is set to 0.05. These
parameter choices imply a capital-to-output ratio K/Y = α/(r+δ) = 3, a reasonable value for
the US. We follow Katz and Murphy (1992) in setting the parameter θ measuring the elasticity
of substitution between education groups to 1.43.
Tax rates Following Domeij and Heathcote (2004), the tax rates on labor and capital
income are set to τn = 0.27 and τa = 0.40, which implies an after-tax return to saving of 3%.
Matching probabilities The correlation between husbands’ and wives’ education level
̺ is constant, and set to 0.517, which is the average in our PSID sample for newly-formed
households (i.e., aged 25-35). Given the model’s equilibrium enrollment rates and the tar-
get education correlation ̺, equation (6) identiﬁes the conditional probability πm
t (h,h). The
remaining three matching probabilities follow from equations (11). The observed rise in ed-
ucational attainment implies substantial changes in the matching probabilities. For example,
across steady-states πm
t (h,h) rises from 0.43 to 0.79.
Productivity shocks The mapping between observed individual hourly wages and in-
dividual labor productivity is not immediate in our model, for two reasons. First, there are
four diﬀerent types of labor in the model, and over time their relative prices change. These
16dynamics induce changes in observed wages that do not correspond to changes in the number
of eﬃciency units of labor supplied per unit of time. In particular, as is clear from equation
(7), one must ﬁlter out changes in prices p
g,e
t to isolate changes in eﬃciency units.
Second, an individual’s wage is observed in the data only if she/he works enough hours
to qualify for inclusion in our sample (260 hours per year). This selection problem is acute
for women, especially in the ﬁrst part of the sample period. Since in the model males and
females are assumed to have the same stochastic process for labor productivity shocks, it can
be estimated using only wage data for males, for whom selection issues are relatively minor
given their strong labor force attachment.20
Let wi,j,t be the hourly wage of individual i of age j at time t. We run an OLS regression
on PSID data of male hourly wages on a time dummy, a time dummy interacted with a college
education dummy (ei), and a cubic polynomial in potential experience (age minus years of





tei + L(j) + yi,j,t (13)
This speciﬁcation is consistent with the wage equation (7) in the structural model. The esti-
mated polynomial function L peaks after 29 years of labor market experience at around twice
the initial wage, and then declines by roughly 1% per year until retirement. The residuals of
equation (13) are a consistent estimate of the stochastic labor productivity component, since
education is predetermined with respect to the realizations of yi,j,t.
As described in equation (8), yi,j,t is modelled as a the sum of transitory plus a persistent
component, with time-varying variances. The choice of this statistical model was guided by
three considerations. First, the autocovariance function for wages (across ages) shows a sharp
drop between lag 0 and lag 1. This pattern suggests the presence of a purely transitory compo-
nent which likely incorporates classical measurement error in wages. Second, there are strong
life-cycle eﬀects in the unconditional variance of wages: in our sample, there is almost a two-fold
increase in the variance between age 25 and age 59. This suggests the existence of a persistent
autoregressive component in wages. This component is modelled as an AR(1) process. Third,
the nonstationarity of the wage process is captured by indexing the distributions for produc-
tivity innovations by year rather than by cohort, following the bulk of the literature which
argues that cohort eﬀects are small compared to time eﬀects in accounting for the rise in wage
inequality in the United States (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993; Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante, 2005).
20Low, Meghir, Pistaferri (2007) provide evidence on this. Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez (2008) make the
same symmetry assumption and ﬁnd that it implies the right magnitude for the female wage variance, under
the model’s selection mechanism. As we will document later, our model has the same implication.
17In Appendix B, we discuss identiﬁcation and estimation of the wage process in detail. Our
estimation method is designed to minimize the distance between model and data with respect
to the variances and covariances of wage residuals across cells identiﬁed by year and overlapping
ten-year age group. We use the Equally Weighted Minimum Distance estimator proposed by
Altonji and Segal (1996) based on Chamberlain (1984), which is frequently employed in this
type of analysis. Since one cannot separately identify the variance of the genuine transitory
shock from the variance of measurement error, we assume that the variance of measurement
error is time-invariant, and use an external estimate.21 Based on the PSID Validation Study
for 1982 and 1986, French (2002) ﬁnds a variance of measurement error in log hourly wages of
0.02, averaging across the two surveys. Expressed as a percentage of the residual wage variance
in our sample, measurement error accounts for 8.5% of the total.
Our ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 2. Panel (B) of Figure 3 shows that
residual wage dispersion (i.e., within male experience/education groups) increased steadily over
this period, and that the estimated model provides an excellent ﬁt to the data. Comparing
this picture to panel (A) in Figure 2 one concludes that the rise in this residual component
accounts for around 2/3 of the total change in wage dispersion–a fraction in line with existing
estimates: Katz and Autor (1999) estimate this fraction to be close to 60%.
Panel (C) of Figure 3 displays the variance of measurement error, the variance of genuine
transitory shocks λ
v
t, and the cumulated variance of persistent shocks: these three components
sum to the total residual variance in panel (B). The variance of transitory shocks grows steadily
throughout the period, while the cumulated variance of the persistent component is ﬂat until
the late 1970s and is growing thereafter, especially during the early 1980s. Consistent with this
pattern, panel (D) shows that the variance of persistent shocks λ
ω
t doubles during the 1975-1985
decade. The point estimate for the initial (age 1) variance of the persistent component λ
η is
0.124, and shocks to this component are very persistent: the estimated annual autocorrelation
coeﬃcient ρ is 0.973 (see Table 2). The table also reports bootstrapped standard errors for all
our estimates. In general, standard errors are small and the trends signiﬁcant. As inputs for





with the HP smoothing parameter equal to ten.
The correlation structure for shocks within the household is the only remaining aspect of the
wage process to consider. The correlation in the initial persistent productivity draw between
husband and wife (which is almost a ﬁxed eﬀect, given the high persistence) is set equal to the
correlation of education levels, i.e., 0.517. Our preferred interpretation for this assumption is
that when matching, agents sort positively with respect to wages, irrespective of whether wage
21The strategy of using independent estimates of measurement error to separate the two components is
common in the literature (e.g., Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004).
18diﬀerences reﬂect education or the initial draw for the persistent component.22 The cross-spouse
correlations for transitory shocks and for innovations to persistent shocks are set to a common
and constant level that reproduces, in equilibrium, the average observed correlation between
wage growth for husbands and wives. This empirical correlation, corrected for measurement
error, is 0.15, which the model replicates when setting, as a structural parameter, the shock
correlation to 0.134.23
4.1.2 Parameters calibrated internally
Utility costs of education We impose that the gender-speciﬁc distributions F g for the
utility cost of attending college are log-normal, lnκ ∼ N(¯ κg,υg
κ), and we choose means ¯ κg and
variances υg
κ to match enrollment rates by gender in the initial and ﬁnal steady-states. The
empirical counterpart for the initial steady state is the fraction of 25-54 year-olds who were
college graduates in 1967: 15.3% for men, and 8.5% for women. The empirical counterpart
for the ﬁnal steady state enrollment rate is an estimate of the fraction of college-graduate
25 year-olds in 2002: 25.6% for men and 31.7% for women. Intuitively, ¯ κg determine average
enrollment levels by gender, while υg
κ regulate the gender-speciﬁc elasticities of enrollment rates
to increases in the college wage premium. The fact that college enrollment has increased more
for women than for men (recall panel (C) in Figure 1) implies less dispersion in the distribution
of female enrollment costs relative to that for men (see Table 1).
When we simulate the economy, the model’s enrollment rates at each date t are those deter-
mined in equilibrium by the calibrated time-invariant cost distribution together with equation
(3). By construction, the implied enrollment rates ﬁt the broad trends documented in panel
(C) of Figure 1.24








22The initial persistent draw does not appear explicitly in our expressions for matching probabilities, but
sorting in this dimension is implicit in expected match values.
23These two choices for within-household shock correlation are supported by existing studies. Hyslop (2001,
Table 3) estimates the correlation between husband and wife ﬁxed eﬀects (which includes education) to be
0.572, and estimates the correlation of persistent shocks to be 0.154 over the 1980-1985 period in a sample of
married households. Attanasio, Low and Sanchez (2008) use the Hyslop estimate for the correlation of shocks
within the household, and thus choose a value very similar to ours.
24The model enrollment rates do not reproduce the spike in male enrollment in the mid 1970s (see panel (C)
of Figure 1) discussed in Section 2. With a time-varying cost distribution we could have replicated enrollment
rates year by year. We chose not to add this extra dimension of nonstationarity to the model given our focus
on changes in the wage structure. Thus our simulations underestimate the college-biased demand shift in the
1970s. However, skill prices are correct since the model is calibrated to match the empirical college premium
year by year.









First, note that even though we do not explicitly model ﬁxed costs of work or indivisibilities,
our preference speciﬁcation allows for labor supply adjustments along the extensive margin: if
the wages of two spouses are suﬃciently diﬀerent, the lower wage spouse will chose zero market
labor supply, and focus exclusively on producing the non-market good.
Estimates of relative risk-aversion between one and two are common in the consumption
literature (see Attanasio, 1999, for a survey), so we set γ = 1.5. We set the utility weight
of non-market time relative to market consumption to ψ = 0.335 to match average household
hours worked in the market, estimated to be 30% of the time endowment (assumed to be
15 ∗ 365 = 5,475 hours per year per individual) over the sample period.
Given our functional forms and parametric restrictions, market consumption, the husband’s
non-market hours and the wife’s non-market hours all enter separably in household period
utility. Moreover, σ serves two purposes. First, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for individual non-market time is exactly 1/σ, hence σ regulates the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply.25 Second, 1/σ is the static elasticity of substitution between male and female time in
producing the non-market good. Consequently, σ will determine the allocation of time within
the household. In particular, when the optimal division of time is interior for both spouses,















Thus the extent to which within-household wage diﬀerentials translate into diﬀerences in market
hours is increasing in 1/σ.
We set σ = 3. This value satisﬁes three criteria. First, this choice exactly replicates
the empirical ratio of average female to average male hours of 0.48 (averaged over the entire
period). Second, the implied mean Frisch elasticity of labor supply for men is 0.48 and the one
for women is 1.46.26 These values are well within the range of gender-speciﬁc micro estimates
(see Blundell MaCurdy, 1999, for a survey of micro estimates, and Domeij and Flod´ en, 2006, for
an argument based on liquidity constraints for why micro-estimates may be downward biased).
Third, with this choice the model almost exactly replicates the empirical correlation of −0.11
between changes in male wages and changes in female hours worked over the sample period.27
25Recall that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is (1/σ)(1 − ng)/ng.
26The elasticity for women in the model declines from 1.77 in 1967 to 1.23 in 2005. This fall is consistent with
the ﬁndings of Blau and Kahn (2005), who document a decline in married women’s labor supply elasticities
between 1980 and 2000.
27The raw correlation is −0.087 and when correcting for measurement error it is lowered to −0.11. The
20Satisfying these three criteria is an important indicator of the model’s ability to capture
household behavior. The ﬁrst and second results show that one can account for gender diﬀer-
ences in average hours and in the sensitivity of hours to changes in wages without introducing
any asymmetries in how male and female non-market hours enter preferences, or in the process
for individual wage shocks. The third result provides an implicit empirical validation for the
degree of within-household risk-sharing that the model delivers through the joint labor supply
decision. We conclude that this simple two-parameter (σ,ψ) model of non-market work can
account surprisingly well for the salient features of time allocation within the household.28
As emphasized by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), agents must have a realistic
amount of wealth for the model to feature the appropriate amount of self insurance through
savings. In the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, the ratio of average wealth to average pre-
tax earnings was 3.94 (D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull, 1997, Tables 6 and 9). With
β = 0.969 our model matches this ratio in 1992.29 This value for β implies that the model
economy has, on average, a small negative net foreign asset position (in 1992 foreign-owned
assets are 9.0% of the domestic capital stock).
Borrowing constraint The ad-hoc borrowing constraint a is calibrated to match the
proportion of agents with negative or zero wealth. In 1983, this number was 15.5% (Table 1 in
Wolﬀ, 2000). The implied borrowing limit is 20% percent of mean annual individual after-tax
earnings in the initial steady state.
Pension beneﬁts The US social security system pays old-age pension beneﬁts based on
a concave function of average earnings. Several authors have documented that the implied
risk-sharing is signiﬁcant (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2004). Explicitly including such a system
in our model would be computationally expensive, since two indexes of accumulated earnings
would have to be added as state variables. Here, we adopt a simpler, stylized version which
captures the redistribution embedded in the US system. In particular, all workers receive the
correction assumes that hourly wages inherit all measurement error from hours, and that the variance of these
errors is 0.02, as estimated by French (2002). The correlation in the model over the same period is −0.10.
28Our separable speciﬁcation between market and non-market goods implies that the static elasticity of
substitution (SEP) between the two goods varies across households, and our choices for γ and σ imply that
this elasticity is generally less than one (derivations are available upon request). Real business cycle models
with a representative stand-in household sometimes assume larger static elasticities in order to increase internal
propagation (e.g., Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright, 1991). However, a large value for the SEP at the micro level
in our model would imply implausibly high volatility for individual market hours and an implausibly negative
intra-household correlation of market hours. As the recent literature on the Frisch labor supply elasticity has
emphasized (e.g., Chang and Kim, 2006) “small” values for elasticities at the micro level are not necessarily
inconsistent with “large” equilibrium values at the aggregate level.
29In comparing average household wealth across model and data, we exclude the wealth-richest 1% of house-
holds in both, since the very richest households in the SCF are missing in both the PSID and in our model (see
Section 5 and Storesletten et al., 2004, for more discussion).
21same lump-sum pension, b, the value of which is such that the dispersion of discounted lifetime
earnings plus pension income in the ﬁnal steady state of our economy is the same as in an
alternative economy featuring the actual US Old-Age Insurance system. The implied value for
b is 24.5% of mean individual after-tax earnings in the initial steady state.30









exogenous demand shifts in favor of educated workers and women so that the model’s time
paths for the equilibrium male college wage premium and gender wage gap exactly match the
trends in their empirical counterparts, where these trends are deﬁned by applying an HP ﬁlter
with smoothing parameter equal to ten to the raw data presented in Section 2. Panel (A) of




t are qualitatively similar to those for the
skill premium and the (inverse of the) gender gap.
Table 1 summarizes the calibration strategy and parameter values. The Technical Appendix
T-1 outlines the computational algorithm for solving and simulating the model economy.
5 Results
This section presents the results of our numerical simulations. First, we simulate the calibrated
benchmark economy, when all elements of the vector λt are time-varying. We compare the
model-implied paths for the cross-sectional moments of interest to their data counterparts. For
this comparison we focus on changes over time by demeaning all variances and correlations. To
properly compare levels of inequality across model and data would require a careful treatment
of measurement error and preference heterogeneity. However, one can safely compare trends
in inequality as long as the variances of measurement error and preference heterogeneity are
stationary (see Heathcote et al., 2008a).
In a set of decomposition experiments we change the components of λt one at a time, holding
the other components ﬁxed at initial steady-state levels.31 This allows us to assess the extent
to which the predicted dynamics are primarily attributable to (i) skill-biased demand shifts (ii)
gender-biased demand shifts, (iii) changes in the variance of persistent shocks, and (iv) changes
in the variance of transitory shocks.
Finally, we run a set of counterfactual experiments assessing the importance of the various
decision margins households use to respond to changes in the wage structure: self-insurance
through borrowing and saving, individual labor supply, female participation, and education.
30See Technical Appendix T-1 for further details.
31For each of these decompositions, we compute a new path for the scaling factor Zt following the same
strategy described in Section 4.
225.1 Macroeconomic implications
We compare theoretical moments computed from simulated model output to the corresponding
empirical moments computed from the CPS (for wages, hours, and earnings) and from the CEX
(for consumption).32
Life cycle Although the focus of the exercise is on changes in cross-sectional inequality
over time, it is useful to check the performance of the model along the life-cycle dimension.
Thus, we begin by reporting the life-cycle dynamics in the mean and variance of household
earnings and consumption for the cohort which is 25-29 years old in 1980 –the initial year of
the consumption sample– and we compare it to the 1980 cohort in the model (Figure 4). The
model slightly overestimates the rise in mean household earnings after age 45, but it replicates
the other life-cycle facts remarkably well. We now turn to the performance of the model along
the time dimension.
Female college premium Panel (A) of Figure 5 describes the evolution of the female
college premium (conditional on participation) in model and data. Recall that the model is
calibrated to replicate the path for the male college premium. Panel (A) indicates that the
model is able to replicate the fact that the female college premium has grown somewhat less
than the corresponding male premium over the sample period (see Figure 1). Recall that female
college enrollment increases more than male enrollment over this period. Thus, towards the
end of the sample women college graduates tend to be younger than high school graduates in
the cross-section, and this negative experience gap delays the rise in the female skill premium.
Panel (C) indicates that, not surprisingly, the dynamics of the college premium are almost
exclusively attributable to skill-biased demand shifts. Labor demand shifts favoring women
have a small positive eﬀect on the college premium, because women are disproportionately high-
school graduates in the 1970s and 1980s, and thus increasing female labor force participation
reduces the relative supply of skilled labor.
Relative hours worked Panel (B) of Figure 5 plots average female hours worked relative
to average male hours worked. The model accounts for roughly three quarters of the increase in
relative female hours over this period. Panel (D) indicates that the dynamics of relative hours
are entirely driven by a narrowing wage gap (see also Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan, 2003).
32Recall that to estimate the time-varying parameters {λt} we used data from the PSID, since our identiﬁca-
tion scheme relies on the panel dimension. We chose to use CPS data for the model evaluation because the CPS
sample is much larger than the PSID and CEX samples (see Table A-1), and thus trends in empirical moments
are more easily discerned. In the Technical Appendix T-2, we compare the time-paths for all the moments
of interest across the PSID and CPS. Although there is more noise in the PSID series, reﬂecting the smaller
sample, lower frequency trends are generally very similar to those in the CPS.
23We ﬁnd evidence of positive selection in the model. The gender gap for average observed
wages is smaller than for oﬀered wages, because low-wage women married to high-wage men tend
to not work full time. Blau and Kahn (2006) provide empirical support for this type of selection
in the US in the 1980s and 1990s, using a wage imputation procedure for women working few or
zero hours. Over time, as increasing female wages induce less productive women to work, the
selection eﬀect weakens in the model. The fact that the gap in oﬀered wages narrows rapidly
(relative to the gap in observed wages) helps explain why the model generates such a surge in
female market work.
The ﬁnding that the model accounts for the bulk of the increase in female hours over
the period, and essentially the entire increase after 1980, is important since it means that our
framework can address the implications of the transition from the traditional single-male-earner
household towards the current dual-earner prototype. At the same time, the fact that our model
falls short of replicating the increase in female hours in the 1960s and early 1970s suggests a role
for alternative supply-based explanations during this period, such as cultural change (Goldin
and Katz, 2002; Fern´ andez and Fogli, 2005), rapid technological progress in the home sector
(Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2005), and declines in childcare costs (Attanasio, Low,
and Sanchez, 2008).
Wage inequality Figure 6 shows the evolution of the cross-sectional variance of log
wages for men and women. Model and data align well in both cases. For men, this result
conﬁrms that, when fed back into the model, our statistical decomposition of the wage process
into components attributable to age, education and persistent and transitory shocks aggregates
back up to reproduce the time series for cross-sectional inequality.33
For women, the close alignment between the model and data series for wage inequality oﬀers
ex-post support for our assumption that the processes for male and female wages are symmetric.
Panels (C) and (D) indicate that skill bias, persistent shocks, and transitory shocks all play
important roles in accounting for the dynamics of wage inequality over this period.
Hours inequality Figure 7 displays the variances of log male and female hours. The
model successfully replicates the fact that the level of cross-sectional dispersion in female market
hours is much higher than for male market hours, even though our preference speciﬁcation
and wage process treat male and female leisure symmetrically. The reason is that the Frisch
elasticity for market hours is decreasing in average hours worked. Given the gender wage gap,
within-household eﬃcient allocations typically imply less market work for the wife, so women’s
33There are several reasons the match is not perfect: (i) the data plotted is from the CPS, while our process
for residual wage dispersion is estimated from the PSID; (ii) the joint distributions over age and education in
model and data do not perfectly align year by year; and (iii) the inputs for the wage process are smoothed to
ﬁlter out high-frequency ﬂuctuations.
24market hours are more sensitive to wage changes.
Over time, the model generates a small rise in hours inequality for men, compared to
an essentially ﬂat empirical time proﬁle. Panel (C) indicates that this rise is driven mostly by
stronger transitory shocks. For women, however, the model predicts a ﬂat proﬁle for the variance
of hours, in contrast to the observed decline in hours inequality (panel (B)). This reﬂects the
existence of several oﬀsetting forces (see panel (D)). Larger transitory and persistent shocks
drive up dispersion in female hours. At the same time, the narrowing gender gap increases
average female hours, thereby reducing the average Frisch elasticity for female labor supply
and hours variability. To better understand how a narrowing gender gap works to reduce
inequality in female hours, note that if the gender wage gap were to vanish entirely in our
symmetric model, the distribution for female market hours would become identical to that for
males.34
Wage-hours correlation Figure 8 plots the cross-sectional correlation between the in-
dividual log wage and individual log hours. As documented in Section 2, there is a dramatic
rise in the wage-hour correlation for men in the 1970s and 1980s. The model reproduces both
the magnitude and the timing of this increase.35
Panel (C) of the ﬁgure indicates that each component of the wage process is important for
determining the overall evolution of the wage-hour correlation. Given our assumption on risk
aversion (γ > 1), wealth eﬀects cause individual hours to move inversely with uninsurable wage
changes, whereas market hours will move in step with wage changes that can be insured either
through saving or through intra-household time reallocation. In the context of our model,
34A closer examination of the CPS data indicates that, mechanically, the main reason for the decline in
women’s hours dispersion is the increased clustering at full-time work (i.e., 2000 hours per year). This decline
could be artiﬁcially inﬂated by heaping (i.e., rounding-oﬀ) in hours reports, a typical bias of retrospective
surveys. However, part of it is certainly genuine. One way to reproduce this trend would be to extend the
model, either by allowing for a part-time penalty in oﬀered wages, or by restricting the hours decision to, say,
zero, part-time, or full-time. In such a model, women would tend to work either relatively few hours or full-time.
A narrowing gender gap would then push more and more women into the full-time category.
35The average level of this correlation is positive in the model, but negative in the data. In large part, the low
number in the data reﬂects measurement error (the “division bias”): if an individual’s report of hours worked
is too high (low), their imputed hourly wage, computed as earnings divided by hours, is automatically too low
(high). The CPS oﬀers two alternative ways to estimate hours worked, based two diﬀerent questions, one about
“usual weekly hours worked this year”, and the other about “hours worked last week”. The ﬁrst question should
provide a more accurate estimate for total hours worked in the previous year, but it was only asked beginning
with the 1976 survey. Because we want to measure hours in a consistent way across our entire sample period, we
use the ﬁrst question. However, for the post-1976 period we computed moments both ways. Reassuringly, the
implied trends in the wage-hours correlation are essentially identical, both for men and for women. However,
consistent with the conjecture that the usual-weekly-hours variable is less subject to measurement error, we
found that the sub-sample correlation increases by 0.18 when hours are computed this way. Assuming that
earnings are measured perfectly, so all measurement error in wages comes from hours, and using our external
estimate for measurement error in wages of 0.02 (see Section 4.1), implies a measurement-error-corrected wage-
hour correlation of 0.10, which signiﬁcantly narrows the gap between data and model.
25the secular upward trend in the college premium has been largely uninsurable (conditional on
educational choice), and has reduced the wage-hour correlation. However, this eﬀect is more
than oﬀset by the positive impact of more volatile transitory shocks – which are straightforward
to insure through precautionary savings – and by the eﬀect of gender-biased demand shifts.
Labor demand shifts towards women drive up the correlation between male hours and male
wages because the larger is the fraction of household income attributable to the female, the
smaller is the impact of a shock to the male wage on household consumption, and thus the
smaller the wealth eﬀect on male hours.
The path for the female wage-hour correlation is ﬂatter than the correlation for men, both in
the model and data. As women’s share of household earnings has risen, household consumption
has responded increasingly strongly to female wage shocks, and these larger wealth eﬀects
moderate the increase in the wage-hour correlation. This also explains why the wage-hour
correlation for women is higher than for men, both in the model and the data: on average the
wealth eﬀects associated with wage changes are smaller for women.
The variance of individual earnings predicted by the model (not plotted) lines up closely
with the data for both men and women. In both model and data, the increase in male earnings
inequality is larger than the increase in wage inequality, which mathematically reﬂects an
increasing wage-hour correlation.
Household earnings and consumption inequality Figure 9 shows the time paths for
the variances of household earnings and household consumption. The variance of household log
earnings is one moment for which the CPS and the PSID are not in full agreement, particularly
towards the end of the sample, where inequality rises more rapidly in the CPS.36 The increase
in household earnings inequality generated by the model (14 log points) lies in between the CPS
and PSID series, and is closer to the PSID, as might be expected given that we use the PSID
to estimate time variation in the wage structure. The rise in household earnings inequality in
our CEX sample also lies in between that observed in the CPS and the PSID.
Panel (C) indicates that the dynamics of household earnings dispersion are primarily driven
by increases in the variances of transitory and persistent shocks. The model-generated rise in
household earnings inequality is smaller than the rise in individual wage and earnings inequality
because shocks at the individual level are imperfectly correlated within the household, and
household earnings can be further smoothed by reallocating hours between husband and wife.
Furthermore, demand shifts in favor of women reduce incentives for women to specialize in
the non-market sector, increasing scope for within-household insurance over time, and further
mitigating the rise in household earnings inequality. The role of skill-biased demand shifts is
36We discuss the source of this discrepancy in the Technical Appendix T-2.
26muted by the imperfect correlation of education within the household, and by the fact that the
skill bias in labor demand drives down the wage-hour correlation (recall Figure 8).
Panel (B) describes the dynamics in the variance of household log consumption (ND+).
The data show a modest increase in consumption inequality over the 1980 to 2003 period. The
increase in consumption inequality generated by the model is very similar to that observed in
the CEX.
The counter-factual experiments in which only one component of the wage process is time-
varying shed light on the mapping from earnings inequality to consumption inequality. A
comparison of panels (C) and (D) reveals that demand shifts have quantitatively similar impacts
on earnings inequality and consumption inequality. This reﬂects the fact that agents respond
to changes in relative demand primarily by changing education choices and the allocation of
market work within the household, rather than by adjusting savings. Similarly, Attanasio and
Davis (1996) ﬁnd that low-frequency changes in relative wages between educational groups lead
to similar changes in relative consumption.37
In contrast to demand shifts, changes in the variance of wage risk have very diﬀerent eﬀects
on earnings and consumption inequality, reﬂecting self insurance through savings. When only
the variance of transitory shocks is time-varying, the increase in the variance of consumption
over the 1965-2003 period is just 9% of the increase in the variance of household log earnings.
This conﬁrms that transitory shocks can be smoothed eﬀectively with the risk-free asset. Iso-
lating the impact of increasingly volatile persistent shocks delivers an increase in consumption
inequality 59% as large as the increase in earnings inequality. Thus households in the model
achieve a degree of self-insurance even against highly persistent shocks, which is consistent with
empirical evidence to the eﬀect that permanent income shocks only partially translate into con-
sumption growth (see, for example, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2007). In the benchmark
simulation, when all dimensions of the wage structure are time-varying, the increase in con-
sumption inequality is 38% as large as the increase in earnings inequality, a ratio consistent
with the available data.
Krueger and Perri (2006, Figures 2 and 5) decompose the rise in consumption inequality
into changes within and between groups. They document that half of the rise in consumption
inequality was due to residual (within-group) inequality, and that the Huggett (1993) version
of the standard incomplete-markets model delivers too large an increase in residual dispersion,
whereas their debt-constrained economy delivers too little. They conclude that the amount of
37Demand shifts in favor of educated labor induce a change in consumption inequality even though they are
assumed to be foreseen (after 1965). This is because high-school graduates who are of working age when demand
starts favoring college graduates cannot avoid low permanent income and consumption levels. Moreover, even
when the upward trend in skill-biased labor demand is foreseen, an individual who draws a very high schooling
cost κ will optimally choose to remain unskilled and suﬀer low lifetime income.
27insurance available to households in the US economy is somewhere in between the two models.
Our model, which has many more channels of self insurance than the Huggett model, gen-
erates an increase in within-education-group consumption inequality that is precisely half of
the total. However, in the data the rise of the within-group component occurs mostly in the
1980s, whereas in our model it grows smoothly throughout the 1990s as well. One possible in-
terpretation of this ﬁnding is that households’ borrowing constraints were relaxed in the 1990s,
which is the main argument of Krueger and Perri (2006).
Wealth inequality Our model does not capture the empirical level of wealth inequality.
In 1992, the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth for married households was 0.76 (D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez et al.,
1997), compared to 0.57 in the model. The discrepancy is particularly large at the very top:
the richest 1% of the population holds 5% of aggregate wealth in the model, compared to 30%
in US data. This is a common shortcoming of incomplete-market models (see Casta˜ neda, D´ ıaz-
Gim´ enez, and R´ ıos-Rull, 2003, and Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, for alternative calibration
strategies that generate realistic wealth inequality). Excluding the wealthiest one percent of
households, the model replicates the stability of wealth concentration in the data over this
period: the Gini coeﬃcient for household-level net worth in the Survey of Consumer Finances
increased by 0.018 between 1983 and 1998 (Wolﬀ, 2000, Table 2) while over the same period
our model predicts a decline of 0.007.
Labor productivity Panel (A) of Figure 10 plots aggregate labor productivity (output
per hour) in the model relative to the detrended data.38 Recall that our computational experi-
ment is designed so that all changes in labor productivity originate from behavioral adjustments
to the varying wage structure. The model generates a decline in labor productivity in the 1970s
and a sharp rise after the mid 1990s – two key features of the actual US data.
Panel (B) decomposes productivity dynamics. Demand changes favoring female labor reduce
aggregate labor productivity, since they shift the pool of workers disproportionately towards
women who, on average, earn less per hour than men. In contrast, increased demand for skilled
workers shifts the pool towards college graduates who, on average, earn more than high-school
graduates. In the 1970s, when the gender gap is narrowing rapidly, the ﬁrst force dominates.
In subsequent decades, the second force gradually takes over, as growth in the college premium
accelerates and college enrollment rises. While the upward trend in enrollment implies a net
gain in aggregate productivity over the entire sample period, median wages (not plotted) decline
substantially, primarily because the median worker is always a high school graduate. Panel (B)
38The data series is “Output Per Hour of All Persons: Nonfarm Business Sector”, series OPHNFB in FRED,
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2. The data plotted in Figure 10 are deviations from a linear trend
applied to the log of the original series from 1967 to 2005.
28also shows a sizable productivity gain due to the rise in transitory uncertainty. Transitory
shocks are relatively insurable, and since labor supply is ﬂexible, households optimally time
market hours to exploit (transitory) periods of high wages.39
5.2 Welfare implications
The ability of the model to account for cross-sectional dynamics over the sample period en-
courages us to consider the welfare implications of the estimated changes in structural labor
market parameters.
Methodology For households entering the labor market in year t, the average welfare
gain associated with changes in the wage structure is measured as the percentage increase in
lifetime market consumption required to make households in a benchmark cohort indiﬀerent
between entering the labor market (behind a veil of ignorance) in the benchmark year versus
entering in year t. Recall that the only reason welfare will diﬀer across cohorts is because of time
variation in λt. We also compute expected household welfare conditional on the educational
composition of the household.
We take 1965 as the benchmark year. This is the year when new information is revealed
about the dynamics of the vector λt, so our welfare numbers are not aﬀected by surprise eﬀects
concentrated in a short period of time. Moreover, using the 1965 cohort as the baseline for
our welfare comparison rather than initial steady state cohorts (those entering the labor force
in 1929 or earlier) will allow us to compare our welfare numbers with other estimates in the
literature (see below). All our welfare calculations factor in education costs, which is important
because enrollment increases over time in response to demand shifts in favor of college graduates.
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39The larger the Frisch elasticity, the larger the productivity gain from a rise in transitory dispersion. See
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008b) for a thorough analysis of this point in a partial insurance model
admitting closed-form solutions.
29The average welfare gain across all household types is deﬁned by a similar equation where
the terms involving lifetime utilities and education costs are now population-weighted sums
across the diﬀerent types. For example, values and expected schooling costs for type (h,l) in
cohort t are weighted by qm
t πm
t (h,l).
Attanasio and Davis (1996) and Krueger and Perri (2003) estimate stochastic processes for
consumption (and leisure) using CEX data, and evaluate the welfare eﬀects of rising inequality
with standard CRRA preferences. In a similar vein, Storesletten (2003) evaluates the welfare
implications of changes in the empirical CEX distributions of consumption and leisure. These
studies report welfare losses between 1% and 2% of lifetime consumption. This empirical
approach has the advantage that no assumptions have to be made on markets, technologies,
or agents’ choice sets. However, it has several drawbacks relative to our structural approach,
which lead these authors to overestimate welfare losses.
First, absent a structural model, it is not possible to connect changes in relative wages to
changes in average productivity. Thus papers following the empirical approach are forced to
exclude “level eﬀects” by detrending the data. In our structural model, skill- and gender-biased
demand shifts change average productivity through their eﬀects on human-capital accumulation
and female participation, while a rise in transitory wage volatility leads to higher productivity
through modiﬁed labor supply decisions. All these “level eﬀects” are captured in our welfare
numbers. A related point is that only a structural model can isolate the role of changes
in the wage structure (rather than changes in the tax code or other factors) in explaining
time variation in the distributions of hours and consumption. The advantage of being explicit
about what drives changes in inequality is that diﬀerent drivers will have diﬀerent eﬀects on
average productivity and welfare (we return to this point when exploring changes in diﬀerent
subcomponents of the wage structure).
An additional problem with the Attanasio and Davis (1996) approach is that when comput-
ing welfare eﬀects, they average over education groups, but hold ﬁxed the weights on the two
groups over time. Thus their welfare calculations tend to exaggerate welfare losses, because
they do not incorporate the fact that infra-marginal agents can choose to switch from the low-
to the high-education group when the college premium rises.40 The wage gains and switching
costs of agents who exercise this option do appear in our welfare calculation in equation (17).
40To illustrate this point, consider an example: Suppose there are two groups in the population, low-skilled
and high-skilled, and suppose the diﬀerence in consumption between the groups increases between t and t + 1.
This would, from an ex-ante viewpoint, induce a welfare loss between t and t + 1. However, if households can
switch from the low- to the high-skill group by paying a cost, then the appropriate welfare comparison would
put diﬀerent weights on the two groups at t and t + 1 (and subtract the average incurred switching cost from
the utility of the switchers). Since switching is optimal for the switchers, this latter welfare calculation will
imply a smaller welfare loss.
30Notwithstanding these advantages to our structural approach, one important caveat is that
our welfare results are sensitive to the assumed path for the scaling factor in the aggregate
production technology, Zt. Recall that the path for Zt is chosen such that changes in λt do not
impact productivity, absent a behavioral response. Suppose, for a moment, that allocations were
chosen by a benevolent utilitarian planner. Following a change in λt, the planner could always
replicate the initial allocation; hence any response on the part of the planner would be welfare-
improving, by a revealed-preference logic. In an incomplete-markets environment, however,
skill- or gender-biased demand shifts, as well as increased dispersion of individual productivity,
have important distributional eﬀects that cannot be ignored in the welfare calculus. Since
demand shifts favoring women tend to reduce inequality, the associated distributional eﬀects
are positive and thus such shifts are likely to be welfare-improving. By contrast, demand shifts
favoring college-graduates increase inequality, and it is unclear a priori whether gains from
increased productivity will outweigh the negative distributional impact. We now turn to our
ﬁndings.
Average (ex-ante) welfare Panel (A) of Figure 11 plots the average welfare change
for cohorts entering the labor market in years t ≥ 1965. Cohorts entering before the early
1980s experience welfare losses up to 0.5% of lifetime consumption. Cohorts entering after
1983 experience welfare gains, and the gains are increasing over time. For example, the cohort
entering the labor market in 1990 enjoys a welfare gain, relative to the 1965 cohort, of 0.9%.
Panel (C) of Figure 11 plots the contribution of each component of structural change (persis-
tent and transitory shocks, skill-biased and gender-biased demand shifts) to the overall welfare
eﬀect. Larger transitory shocks have trivial distributional eﬀects, since they are easily insur-
able. The implied welfare gains – due to increased labor productivity – are small and evenly
distributed across all cohorts, including the 1965 cohort. This is why the gains from transitory
uncertainty are negligible for subsequent cohorts relative to 1965 cohort.41
The large increase in the variance of persistent shocks is the main source of welfare losses
for the typical US household. Since these shocks are so durable, buﬀer-stock savings are of
limited use as an insurance device. If one were to focus only on the welfare eﬀects of the rise in
residual wage variability (transitory plus persistent shocks), one would conclude that changes
in the wage structure led to welfare losses of around 2.0% of consumption.42
41Relative to living their entire life in the initial steady state, the 1965 cohort enjoys an expected welfare gain
of 0.7%, of which 0.3% is due to larger transitory shocks.
42This was, in fact, the conclusion we reached in Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2004). There the wage
process also included a ﬁxed individual eﬀect and, as a result, the persistent component had lower durability:
the autoregression coeﬃcient ρ was 0.94. The 2% welfare loss obtained in our early draft was the result of both
components (time-varying ﬁxed eﬀects and persistent shocks). Here, we have abstracted from ﬁxed eﬀects and,
not surprisingly, the estimated AR(1) component is more persistent: ρ = 0.97.
31Increased relative demand for female labor reduces average labor productivity in the market
sector, because it increases hours worked by women who earn less than men, on average. At the
same time, a more even allocation of time within the household eﬀectively increases productivity
in the home sector, and also improves within-household risk sharing of individual wage shocks.
As expected, the positive eﬀects dominate. For example, the welfare gain from the gender-
biased demand shifts is equivalent to 0.7% of consumption for the 1990 cohort.
Panel (C) indicates that skill-biased demand shifts generated sizable welfare gains for the
average US household. Both demand shifts favoring graduates (an increase in λ
S
t ) and bigger
persistent shocks (an increase in λ
ω
t ) imply increased cross-sectional consumption inequality
(see Figure 9, panel D). However, the two phenomena have opposite implications for welfare.
This asymmetry arises because in response to the skill-biased demand shift, individuals have the
opportunity to avoid the low-wage outcome through a behavioral response: inframarginal agents
change their education decision, relative to the initial steady state, in favor of college. The
dramatic rise in college enrollment witnessed in the US (and replicated in the model) indicates
that many households took advantage of this opportunity. Mechanically, in the calculation of
average welfare, the weight on households with at least one college-graduate spouse rises in
each successive cohort, with positive and sizable implications for average labor productivity
and welfare.
Our estimates of the welfare gains from skill-biased demand shifts depend on the size of the
education costs. In particular, welfare gains will be smaller the larger are education costs on
average, and the more rapidly costs per student rise with enrollment.43
Within and between group welfare eﬀects Panel (B) shows welfare changes condi-
tional on household type. As long as a household has at least one college educated member,
it is signiﬁcantly better oﬀ in expected terms, relative to the 1965 cohort. By contrast, the
high-school/high-school households, accounting for 65% of all households in 1990, experience
a remarkable welfare loss of 3.7% of lifetime consumption. Panels (C) and (D) reveal that
the losses for these low-skilled households, relative to other households, are driven by adverse
labor-demand shifts.44
43We conducted two simple experiments to examine how the education costs aﬀect our welfare numbers. First,
we assumed that all additional college attendees during the transition have the same utility cost of going to
college, where this cost is equal to the average cost in the initial steady state – an upper bound to the gains from
skill-biased demand shifts. Second, we assumed that costs rise over time such that every additional college-goer
is indiﬀerent between going to college or not – this is a lower bound. Average welfare gains in our model lie
roughly midway between these two bounds: for example the bounds for average welfare for the 1990 cohort are
−1.3% and 2.8%, while the model value is 0.9%.
44In contrast to skill-biased demand shifts, gender-biased demand shifts beneﬁt every household in the model,
because we focus on married couples. If we had single men in the model, they would unambiguously lose from
the growth in the relative demand for female labor.
32Within education groups, we ﬁnd large heterogeneity in ex-post welfare eﬀects which are
driven by diﬀerences in histories of persistent and transitory shocks. For example, 29% of
high-school/high-school households in the 1990 cohort experience a welfare gain ex post, not
withstanding the large expected welfare loss for this group. The 90-10 diﬀerential in the distri-
bution of ex-post welfare gains for this household type is 14.9%.
5.3 Insurance and opportunities
The observed changes in the US wage structure have ampliﬁed the risks households face in the
labor market, but they have also oﬀered new economic opportunities by raising the relative
wages of women and of individuals who obtain a college education. In this section, we use
our model to study how US households have modiﬁed their economic choices to mitigate the
adverse eﬀects of rising uncertainty and to take advantage of these new opportunities.
Four distinct channels of behavioral response are considered: savings, ﬂexible labor supply,
female participation, and college enrollment. To isolate the role of each channel, we run a
series of counterfactuals in which we “freeze” one margin of adjustment at a time. In each case
we adopt the benchmark parametrization, including the benchmark sequences {λt} and {Zt}.




Savings: We begin by solving the economy under the restriction that household asset hold-
ings are zero each period, and compare the outcomes to the benchmark economy with access
to credit markets.45 The results are displayed in Figure 12. Agents now use labor supply as a
substitute for savings to respond to wage shocks and to smooth consumption, lowering (raising)
market hours in response to higher (lower) wages.46 This strategy translates into a substantially
lower wage-hour correlation and lower earnings dispersion than in the baseline economy (see
panels (A) and (C) in Figure 12). Absent savings, cross-sectional dispersion in household con-
sumption must equal dispersion in household earnings. Thus the no-savings economy features
both a higher level of consumption inequality and a larger increase in consumption inequality
than the benchmark economy (panel (B)). Households entering the labor market after the mid
1980s suﬀer a welfare loss in the no-savings economy of around two percent of lifetime con-
sumption relative to the 1965 cohort (panel (D)), in stark contrast to the welfare gains that
accrue to these cohorts in the baseline model.
Labor supply: We then compare the benchmark economy to one without a ﬂexible choice
45In this counterfactual economy, the entire aggregate demand for capital is satisﬁed by foreign assets.
46The quantitative study by Pijoan-Mas (2006) also ﬁnds that households make ample use of work eﬀort as
a self-insurance mechanism in order to mitigate the welfare costs of market incompleteness.
33of hours - at each date men and women are forced to work their respective average hours in the
initial steady state of the benchmark model. Fixing hours worked has little eﬀect on the level
of earnings inequality, because empirically the wage-hour correlation is close to zero anyway.
However, ﬁxing hours increases the level of consumption inequality by shutting down wealth
eﬀects that reduce (increase) hours and thus earnings for high (low) consumption households.
The additional welfare losses, relative to the baseline model, are about the same as for the
savings channel, indicating that labor supply and savings are equally valuable adjustment
margins. In the rigid labor supply economy, the ratio of mean wealth to mean earnings is 9.0%
larger than in the benchmark model (averaging across the 1965-2000 period), as households
rely more heavily on precautionary savings to smooth shocks.
Female labor force participation: In our next alternative economy we constrain women’s
hours to be zero in every period, while allowing men to choose hours freely. Absent female
participation, the shift in the wage structure would be detrimental: from the 1985 cohort and
onwards, the welfare loss would be four to ﬁve percent lower than in the benchmark economy.
The main reason is that the shrinking gender wage gap makes it very costly to exclude women
from the labor market. Moreover, ruling out female participation reduces the extent to which
more volatile shocks can be self-insured via intra-household reallocation of time.
Interestingly, this alternative economy still generates about half the observed increase in
female college enrollment since 1970, even though women’s earnings are always zero by as-
sumption. The reason is that going to college increases the probability of matching with a
college-educated partner. Rising relative wages for college-educated men therefore increase the
return to education for women through the “marriage market”.
Education choice: To examine the role of education choice as a means for exploiting
the new opportunities oﬀered by a rising skill premium, we consider an economy in which the
fraction of college graduates is ﬁxed at the initial steady state level. The model reveals large
welfare losses when agents cannot adjust their education choices: the welfare loss from changes
in the wage structure would be 7.4% for the cohorts born in 1990, relative to a gain of 0.9%
in the benchmark economy. This is due to three forces. First, the rise in college attendance
in the baseline model has a negative general-equilibrium eﬀect on the college premium, which
partially oﬀsets the positive eﬀect of increased demand for college workers. The no-education-
choice economy assumes away any such supply response, implying a larger increase in the
college premium after 1985.47 Without this powerful force at work, the increase in consumption
47According to the model, the rise in the male college premium would be twice as large in the absence of
increased college enrollment: an increase from 1.3 to 2.6 between 1977 and 2000, compared to an increase from
1.3 to 1.9 in the data and in the benchmark economy.
34inequality would be twice as large (see panel (B)). Second, in the economy with no schooling
choice, the individuals who optimally change decisions in favor of college in the benchmark
economy miss out on the opportunities oﬀered by a higher college premium. Third, there is a
positive externality associated with higher enrollment, reﬂecting the fact that - absent perfect
assortative matching - individuals do not fully internalize the welfare gains associated with a
higher-quality pool in the matching market.
In summary, the four channels of adjustment explored here – savings, ﬂexible hours, female
participation, and enrollment – are all quantitatively important. In terms of alleviating the
adverse eﬀects of rising consumption inequality, the four channels appear to be roughly equally
important: closing any of them would imply about twice the increase in consumption inequality
compared to the baseline model. However, in terms of overall welfare, female participation
and college choice matter much more than saving and ﬂexible labor supply, since they allow
individuals to take advantage of the opportunities created by the dynamics of gender and
skill-biased demand shifts.
6 Conclusion
Since the early 1970s, the US economy has experienced a dramatic change in the wage distri-
bution along several dimensions. First, the college premium doubled. Second, the gender gap
halved. Third, residual individual wage variability increased substantially due to a rise in the
variance of persistent shocks - concentrated primarily in the 1980s - and a steady increase in
the variance of transitory shocks.
In this paper, we studied the macroeconomic and welfare implications of all these changes
through the lens of a version of the neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets and
overlapping generations. Our model extends the prototypical incomplete-markets framework in
several dimensions, adding an education choice, a model of the family in which husbands and
wives face imperfectly correlated persistent and transitory shocks to wages, and a production
technology incorporating labor inputs diﬀerentiated by gender and education.
The payoﬀ from adding all these features is twofold. First, we can provide a detailed de-
scription of the transformation in the US wage structure and of its impact on the distribution of
consumption, hours, earnings and welfare. Second, we can study how US households have mod-
iﬁed their economic decisions (i.e., college attendance, family labor supply, and precautionary
saving) to respond to changes in the macroeconomic environment.
We argued that the model can account for most of the key trends in cross-sectional US data
on hours, earnings and consumption. Each dimension of the wage structure plays an important
35role. Rising transitory wage instability is a key determinant of the growth in the wage-hour
correlation and in household earnings inequality. Larger skill premium and more volatile per-
sistent shocks account for the dynamics in consumption inequality. The narrowing gender gap
explains most of the rise in relative hours worked by women, and also drives convergence across
men and women in higher moments for individual hours.
When we calculated the welfare eﬀects of the observed changes in the wage distribution, we
found that couples comprising two high-school graduates were hit harshly. For these families,
the cohort who entered the labor market in 1990 was 3.7% worse oﬀ than the 1965 cohort in
terms of lifetime consumption. However, every other family-type experiences welfare gains, and
on average the 1990 cohort was better oﬀ than the 1965 cohort by 0.9 percentage points. This
welfare gain contrasts with the conventional view that rising inequality led to large welfare
losses (e.g., Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Krueger and Perri, 2003). Our welfare estimates are
less pessimistic because they are derived in the context of a structural equilibrium model that
incorporates behavioral adjustment in response to exogenous labor market changes.
In extending the standard incomplete-markets model, we generally opted for the simplest
modeling choices, in part because solving for equilibrium transitional dynamics is numerically
challenging. However, the model invites reﬁnement in various dimensions to address a large set
of issues that are not the focus of the present paper.
First, one could pursue alternative models of the family. We assumed that market and
non-market goods are public goods within the family, because this constitutes the smallest
deviation from the standard bachelor-household model, and because we found that this eﬀec-
tively unitary model of the household can successfully replicate key features of time allocation
within the household.48 By contrast, models of the family based on the “collective” paradigm
or on cooperative bargaining emphasize how the distribution of control of resources within the
household can inﬂuence the distribution of private consumption and leisure. For example, Lise
and Seitz (2007) ﬁnd evidence that, in the U.K., the closing of the gender gap induced a decline
in intra-family consumption inequality, with positive implications for welfare.
Second, our model of household formation is fairly rudimentary. Since 1970, Americans
have become less likely to marry across education groups, and more likely to divorce. By
endogenizing choices at the matching stage one could investigate whether the rise in the college
premium, and other changes in the wage structure, can explain these trends in family structure.
Third, we made some stark assumptions on the information set of the agents: they have
48Given our separable preference speciﬁcation, we could have chosen to deﬁne individual utility over con-
sumption and leisure, both private goods, and to represent the household utility function as an equally weighted
average of each spouse’s individual utility. Appropriately recalibrated, this alternative would imply identical
allocations across the initial and ﬁnal steady states, but since it would alter the cost-beneﬁt calculation of
education, welfare calculations would be aﬀected.
36no advanced information on idiosyncratic persistent and transitory wage ﬂuctuations, but have
perfect foresight at the aggregate level over the future variances of these shocks and the evolution
of the college and gender premia. The greater the fraction of future wage changes that is
foreseen, the smaller should be the impact of rising residual wage dispersion on consumption
inequality. Our model generates realistic increases in consumption dispersion both over the
life-cycle and over time, indicating that the consumption data are consistent with the view that
idiosyncratic wage ﬂuctuations are mostly unforeseen by individuals. Nonetheless, it would
be interesting to extend the analysis to consider the implications of alternative information
structures.
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41Table 1: Summary of Parameterization





age-speciﬁc survival rates (U.S. Life Tables) see text
γ micro-estimates of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.50
̺ intra-family correlation of education at ages 25-35 (PSID) 0.517
α capital share of output (NIPA) 0.33
δ depreciation rate (NIPA) 0.06
θ elasticity of substitution between college and high-school graduates 1.43
r risk-free interest rate 0.03
τn,τa labor income and capital income tax rates 0.27,0.40






η,ρ male hourly wage residuals dynamics (PSID) see Table 2
Parameters calibrated internally
κm,υm
κ male college enrollment in initial and ﬁnal steady-state 2.96,0.88
κf,υf
κ female college enrollment in initial and ﬁnal steady-state 2.22,0.31
β ratio of average wealth (for poorest 99%) to average labor income 0.969
ψ average household market hours 0.335
σ ratio of average male to female market hours 3.0
b redistribution (of lifetime earnings) through U.S. pension system 0.245











ratio of average male to female wages, full-time workers see Figure 1
{Zt} average post-tax earnings equal to one, absent behavioral response see text
42Table 2: Parameter Estimates of Wage Process
Persistent Component Transitory Component











































































































































































2000 0.0212 (0.0079) λ
v
2000 0.0872 (0.0131)
Note: Minimum Distance estimates of the parameters of the wage process in equation (8). Standard Errors
(S.E.) are obtained by block-bootstrap based on 500 replications. See Appendix B for details.
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Year




















(D) Female/Male Hours Worked
Year
Figure 1: Cross-Sectional Facts. Sources: CPS for panels (A), (B), (D); U.S. Census Bureau
for enrollment data in panel (C).
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Figure 2: Cross-Sectional Facts. Sources: CPS for panels (A), (B), (C) and earnings data in
panel (D); CEX for consumption data in panel (D). Household consumption expenditures are
equivalized through the Census scale. Sample means in square brackets in the legend.








(A) Skill and Gender Bias
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(B) Residual Variance of Log Male Wages
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Figure 3: Panel (A): Results of the internal calibration for skill- and gender-biased demand
shifts. Panels (B)-(D): Results of the estimation of the residual wage process in equation (8)
from PSID data. The estimation method is discussed in Appendix B. See also Table 2 for
the point estimates and the bootstrapped standard errors. This Figure displays all the four
components of the {λt} sequence.
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Figure 4: Model-data comparison. Evolution of household earnings and equivalized consump-
tion (mean and variance of the logs) over the life cycle of the cohort which is 25-29 years old
in 1980.
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Figure 5: Model-data comparison and decomposition. Evolution of the female college wage
premium and of female-male relative hours worked.
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Figure 6: Model-data comparison and decomposition. Evolution of male and female log wage
dispersion.
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Figure 7: Model-data comparison and decomposition. Evolution of male and female log hours
dispersion.
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Figure 8: Model-data comparison and decomposition. Evolution of male and female correlation
between log wages and log hours.
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Figure 9: Model-data comparison and decomposition. Evolution of dispersion in households
log earnings and log consumption.











































































Figure 10: Model-data comparison and decomposition. The empirical series for aggregate labor
productivity (output per hour) is constructed as log-deviations from a linear time trend.
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(A) Average Welfare Gain 
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(D) Decomposition for (HS,HS)





































































Figure 11: Panels (A)-(C): Average welfare gain and decomposition. Panel (B): Welfare gains
by household type. Panel (D): Decomposition for families where both spouses are high-school
graduates.
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Figure 12: Counterfactual experiments to study the role of households’ behavioral responses to
the shift in the wage structure. The line labelled “Baseline” refers to the benchmark economy.
“No Saving Decision”: economy where household wealth is always zero. “No Hours Decision”:
economy where male and female labor supply is ﬁxed. “No Female Participation”: economy
where women do not work. “No Education Decision”: economy where the fraction of men and
women with college degree is constant at the initial steady-state level.
55A Data description
Our sources for individual and household level data are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the
Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Since all three data sets are
widely used for microeconometric, and more recently, for quantitative macroeconomic research, we shall only
brieﬂy describe them here.
PSID: The PSID is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women, and
children) and the family units in which they reside. Approximately 5,000 households were interviewed in the
ﬁrst year of the survey, 1968. From 1968 to 1997, the PSID interviewed individuals from families in the sample
every year, whether or not they were living in the same dwelling or with the same people. Adults have been
followed as they have grown older, and children have been observed as they advance through childhood and into
adulthood, forming family units of their own (the “split-oﬀs”). This property makes the PSID an unbalanced
panel. Since 1997, the PSID became biennial. The most recent year available, at the time of our analysis, is
2003. In 2003, the sample includes over 7,000 families. The PSID consists of various independent samples. We
focus on the main and most commonly used, the so-called SRC sample, which does not require weights since it
is representative of the U.S. population. Questions referring to income and labor supply are retrospective, e.g.,
those asked in the 1990 survey refer to calendar year 1989.
CPS: The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The sample is selected to represent the civilian non-institutional population.
Respondents are interviewed to obtain information about the employment status of each member of the house-
hold 16 years of age and older. The CPS is the primary source of information on the labor force characteristics
of the U.S. population. Survey questions cover employment, unemployment, earnings, hours of work, and other
indicators. A variety of demographic characteristics is available, including age, sex, race, marital status, and
educational attainment.
In our investigation, we use the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (so-called March Files) in the
format arranged by Unicon Research. Computer data ﬁles are only available starting from 1968, and the latest
year available, at the time of our research, was 2006. In all our calculations, we use weights. As for PSID,
questions referring to income and labor supply are retrospective.
CEX: The CEX is a survey collecting information on the buying habits of American consumers, including
data on their expenditures, income, and consumer unit (household) characteristics. The data are collected by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and used primarily for revising the CPI. The data are collected in independent
quarterly Interview and weekly Diary surveys of approximately 7,500 sample households (5,000 prior to 1999).
We use the data set constructed from the original CEX data by Krueger and Perri (2006) and available on
the authors’ web sites. As is common in most of the previous research, their data uses only the Interview survey
which covers around 95% of total expenditures Frequently purchased items such as personal care products and
housekeeping supplies are only reported in the Diary survey. The period covered by their data is 1980-2003.
CEX data before 1980 is not comparable to the later years. Households who are classiﬁed as incomplete income
respondents by the CEX and have not completed the full set of ﬁve interviews are excluded. We refer to Krueger
and Perri (2006) for additional details on the data construction.
Variable deﬁnitions: The calibration of the model and its evaluation are based on a set of cross-sectional
ﬁrst and second moments constructed from both PSID and CPS. The key variables of interest are: gross (i.e.,
before-tax) annual labor earnings, annual hours, hourly wages and household consumption. We always construct
hourly wages as annual earnings divided by annual hours worked. Nominal wages, earnings, and consumption
are deﬂated with the CPI and expressed in 1992 dollars.
In PSID, gross annual earnings are deﬁned as the sum of several labor income components including wages
and salaries, bonuses, commissions, overtime, tips, etc. Annual hours are deﬁned as “annual hours worked for
money on all jobs including overtime”.
In CPS, gross annual earnings are deﬁned as income from wages and salaries including pay for overtime,
tips and commissions. Annual hours worked are constructed as the product of weeks worked last year and hours
worked last week. Until 1975, weeks worked are reported in intervals (0, 1-13, 14-26,...,50-52). To recode weeks
worked for 1968-1975, Unicon grouped the data in a few years after 1975 by intervals and computed within-
interval means. These means from the later years were applied to the earlier years. The variable “hours worked
56last week at all jobs” is not ideal, but it is the only one continuously available since 1968 and comparable across
years. Starting from the 1976 survey, CPS contains a question on “usual weekly hours worked this year”. As
discussed in the paper, even though levels diﬀer, trends in mean hours, in their variance and in the wage-hour
correlation, which are the focus of our study, are virtually equivalent across the two deﬁnitions.
In CEX, gross annual earnings refer to the amount of wage and salary income before deductions received in
past twelve months. Since we noticed that in the Krueger-Perri ﬁle there were some missing values for earnings,
we merged earnings data from the CEX Public Release Member ﬁles (provided to us by Orazio Attanasio)
into the Krueger-Perri ﬁle and use the former observations whenever earnings data were missing in the original
Krueger-Perri ﬁle. Annual hours worked are deﬁned as the product of “number of weeks worked full or part
time by member in last 12 months” and “number of hours usually worked per week by member”.
Our benchmark deﬁnition for consumption is the same as Krueger and Perri, i.e. the sum of expenditures
on nondurables, services, and small durables (such as household equipment) plus imputed services from owned
housing and vehicles. Each expenditure component is deﬂated by an expenditure-speciﬁc, quarter-speciﬁc CPI.
Household expenditures are equivalized through the Census scale. We label this variable ND+. In the paper, we
also report statistics based on nondurable consumption only (variable ND in Krueger and Perri). See Krueger
and Perri (2006) for further details.
Sample selection: The objective of our sample selection is to apply exactly the same restrictions to PSID,
CPS and CEX. We select married households with no missing values for gender, age, and education where: 1)
the husband is between 25 and 59 years old, 2) annual hours of the husband are at least 260, 3) conditional
on working, the hourly wage (annual earnings divided by annual hours) is above half of the minimum wage for
both spouses, and 4) income is not from self-employment.
The marital status restriction is needed in order to be consistent with the theoretical model. Restriction 1)
is imposed to avoid severe sample selection in the hours and wage data due to early retirement. Restriction 2) is
imposed since 260 hours per year (one quarter part-time) is our deﬁnition of labor force participation. Restric-
tion 3) is imposed to reduce implausible outliers at the bottom of the wage distribution which is particularly
important since we use the variance of log wages as a measure of dispersion (see Katz and Autor, 1999, for a
discussion on the importance of trimming earnings data at the bottom). Restriction 4) is imposed since the
presence of self-employment income makes it diﬃcult to distinguish between the labor and the capital share,
particularly in CPS and CEX, and to deal with negative labor income.
Table A-1 details the sample selection process in the three data sets, step by step. The ﬁnal sample has 43,123
household/year observations in PSID, 600,326 household/year observations in CPS and 21,556 household/year
observations in CEX.
Top-coding: After imposing our selection criteria, there are only 6 top-coded observations in the ﬁnal
PSID sample. Since we found that none of the statistics are aﬀected by those few values, we did not make any
correction for top-coded values. Roughly 2.1% of the earnings values in the ﬁnal CPS sample are top-coded.
Top coding of earnings in CPS changed substantially over the sample period. We follow Autor and Katz (1999)
and multiply all top-coded observations by a factor equal to 1.5 up to 1996 and made no correction after 1996,
when top-coded observations take on the average value of all top-coded observations, by demographic group,
instead of the threshold value. We tried with other factors, for example 1.75 as suggested by Eckstein and
Nagypal (2004), and our ﬁndings remain robust. In the ﬁnal CEX sample there are 362 top-coded observations,
i.e. around 1.7% of the total. Since the top-coding changes virtually in the same ways as in CPS, including the
change of approach after 1996, we used the Autor-Katz strategy for CEX as well.
Comparison across PSID and CPS: Table A-2 shows that–over the period where they overlap (1980-
2003)–the three samples are remarkably similar in their demographic and education structure by gender. Also
means of wages, earnings and hours, by gender, are extremely similar in the three data sets. Finally, average
food consumption expenditures in PSID are very comparable to the CEX estimate.
Enrollment data: The data on college enrollment that we use for the calibration of the model refer to
the percentage of individuals 25-29 years of age who have completed college, by gender and year from 1940
to 2006. The source is Table A.2 of the Educational Attainment section on the U.S. Census Bureau web site,
www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo.
57Table A-1: Sample Selection in PSID, CPS and CEX
PSID (67-96, 98, 00, 02) CPS (67-05) CEX (80-03)
#dropped # remain #dropped # remain #dropped # remain
Initial sample of married households – 68,860 – 1,312,864 – 40,605
Age of husband 25-59 10,274 58,586 354,256 958,608 11,604 29,001
Hours worked of husband at least 260 1,927 56,659 138,269 820,339 1,430 27,571
Wage husband above half minimum wage 1,215 55,444 87,466 732,893 2,316 25,255
Wage wife above half minimum wage 1,723 53,721 32,021 700,872 902 24,353
Income husband not from self-employment 8,784 44,937 28,330 672,542 1,857 22,496
Income wife not from self-employment 1,814 43,123 12,216 660,326 940 21,556
Table A-2: Comparison Across PSID, CPS and CEX Samples
PSID CPS CEX
Average age of men 39.15 40.94 41.26
Average age of women 37.0 38.62 39.2
Fraction of male college graduates 0.31 0.31 0.31
Fraction of female college graduates 0.24 0.24 0.24
Average earnings of men (1992 $) 39,674 40,182 38,441
Average earnings of women (1992 $) 15,097 14,199 15,570
Average hours worked by men 2,223 2,252 2,225
Average hours worked by women 1,258 1,227 1,286
Average hourly wage of men (1992 $) 18.09 18.44 17.49
Average hourly wage of women (1992 $) 9.55 9.33 9.83
Average household earnings (1992 $) 54,772 54,381 54,011
Average food consumption (1992 $) 4,626 – 4,082
58B Identiﬁcation and estimation of the wage process
B.1 Statistical model
As discussed in Section 3.2 of the main text, we posit the following statistical model of the log wage residuals
for individual i of age j at time t. For all j,t
yi,j,t = ηi,j,t + vi,j,t + ˜ vi,j,t





is a transitory (i.e., uncorrelated over time) component capturing measurement error
in hourly wages, vi,j,t ∼ (0,λ
v
t) is a transitory component representing genuine individual productivity shock,
and ηi,j,t is the persistent component of labor productivity. In turn, this persistent component is modelled as
follows. For all j,t > 1
ηi,j,t = ρηi,j−1,t−1 + ωi,j,t
where ωi,j,t ∼ (0,λ
ω
t ). For all t, at age j = 1, ηi,1,t is drawn from the time-invariant initial distribution with
variance λ
η. We assume that ωi,j,t, ˜ vi,j,t, vi,j,t and ηi,1,t are orthogonal to each other, and i.i.d. across individuals
in the population.









. This assumption is made to maintain consistency with the model’s solution and simulations.










are not. We restrict the
variance of measurement error λ
˜ v to be constant for identiﬁcation purposes and, as explained in the main text,
we use an external estimate to identify its size.
B.2 Identiﬁcation: an example
We now describe the identiﬁcation procedure for the case where t = 1,2,4 and j = 1,2,3. This is a useful
example to illustrate our case where, after a certain date, the PSID survey becomes biannual and data for


















η,ρ}. The key challenge is to identify parameters at date t = 3.
Deﬁne the theoretical moment
m
j
t,t+n (Υ) = E (yi,j,t · yi,j+n,t+n). (B-1)
The expectation operator is deﬁned over all individuals i of age j at time t present both at t and at t + n. In
our simple example, we have a total of 12 such moments that we can construct from available data.




















This pair of moments identiﬁes (ρ,λ
η).












1 given knowledge of λ
η.












59we can identify λ
ω
1, given knowledge of the initial variance λ
η and of λ
v
1.




























































As usual, the variance of the entrant cohort identiﬁes λ
v
4, given knowledge of the initial variance λ
η. Comparing
the variance of new cohorts with the variance of age 2 cohorts identiﬁes identify λ
ω
4, the variance of the current
persistent shock. Finally, the variance of the age j = 3 cohort contains the variance of the persistent shock that
hit at the previous date, and this allows identiﬁcation of λ
ω
3.
Two remarks are in order. First, we can identify λ
ω
3 in spite of lack of data for t = 3 because the ω shock
hitting individuals at time t = 3 persists into t = 4, a date for which observations are available. Thus comparing
wage dispersion between a new cohort and an old cohort at t = 4 allows us to identify λ
ω
3 since there are no
cohort eﬀects. Second, in general, one cannot separately identify persistent and transitory shocks in the last
year of the sample. Here we can, thanks, once again, to the assumption of no cohort eﬀects in the initial variance
λ
η.
The only parameter left to identify is λ
v
3. Transitory shocks at t = 3 do not show up in moments at any
other t, and thus we need to impose a restriction to complete our identiﬁcation. There are several possible
choices. We opt for assuming that the cross-sectional variance of wages in the population in the missing years is
a weighted average of the variance in the year before and in the year after. In our speciﬁc example, if we let ¯ mt,t
be the cross-sectional variance of log wages at time t, then we assume that ¯ m3,3 = (¯ m2,2 + ¯ m4,4)/2. Given our







3} one can reconstruct the cross-sectional variance component
due to the cumulation of the persistent shocks up to t = 3. The diﬀerence between the total variance and the




Parameter vector: We have available survey data for 1967-1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. Even though, theo-
retically, the variance of the persistent shocks λ
ω
t is identiﬁed in the missing years, in practice the fact that the
lack of data occurs towards the end of the sample substantially reduces the amount of information available to
estimate such parameters. Moreover, as explained, identiﬁcation in the missing years hinges on the no-cohort
eﬀects assumption. Therefore, we choose to take a cautious approach and estimate λ
ω
t only for those years
when data are available. In simulating the model, we assume that the variance of the persistent shocks for the
missing years is a weighted average of the two adjacent years.
Moreover, as we have explained above, separating the variances of persistent and transitory shocks in the
last year of the sample hinges also upon the, arguably restrictive, assumption of no cohort eﬀects. Therefore,
we choose not to estimate these two variances for 2002, but rather we use the 2002 survey only to improve our
estimation of the structural variances up to 2000 (by constructing covariances between 2002 and the previous






















of L = 66 parameters. Denote by Υ the (L × 1) parameter vector.
Empirical moments: Every year t, we group individuals in the sample into 10-year adjacent age cells
indexed by j, the ﬁrst cell being age group “29” containing all workers between 25 and 34 years old, up until
the last cell for age group “54” with individuals between 50 and 59. Our sample length and age grouping imply
60T = 33 and J = 26. Let m
j
t,t+n (Υ) be the theoretical covariance between wages in the two age-group/year cells
determining the triple (j,t,n), exactly as in (B-1). For every pair (j,t), let ¯ n(j,t) be the maximum number of
moments involving individuals of age j at time t that can be constructed from the sample (taking into account
the fact that some years are missing).
The moment conditions used in the estimation are of the form
E (ιi,j,t,n)
h





where ιi,j,t,n is an indicator function that equals 1 if individual i has observations in both periods/age groups











i=1 b yi,j,t · b yi,j+n,t+n is the empirical covariance between wages for individuals of age
j at time t and wages of the same individuals n periods later. Note that Ij,t,n =
PI
i=1 ιi,j,t,n since not all
individuals contribute to each moment.




[ˆ m − m(Υ)]
′ W [ˆ m − m(Υ)], (B-2)





t=1 ¯ n(j,t), and W is a (N × N) weighting matrix. In our estimation, N = 9,634.
To implement the estimator, we need a choice for W. The bulk of the literature follows Altonji and Segal
(1996) who found that in common applications there is a substantial small sample bias in the estimates of Υ,
hence using the identity matrix for W is a superior strategy to using the optimal weighting matrix characterized
by Chamberlain (1984). With this choice, the solution of equation (B-2) reduces to a nonlinear least square
problem.
Standard errors are computed by block bootstrap, using 500 replications. Bootstrap samples are drawn
at the household level with each sample containing the same number of households as the original sample.
Resulting conﬁdence intervals thus account for arbitrary serial dependence, heteroskedasticity and additional
estimation error induced by the use of residuals from the ﬁrst stage regressions.
Table 2 reports parameter estimates and standard errors. The results of the estimation are discussed in
detail in Section 4.1.
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